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Abstract: We implement a repeated version of the Barro-Gordon 
monetary policy game in the laboratory and ask whether reputation serves 
as a substitute for commitment, enabling the central bank to achieve the 
efficient Ramsey equilibrium and avoid the inefficient, time-inconsistent 
one-shot Nash equilibrium.  We find that reputation is a poor substitute for 
commitment. We then explore whether central bank cheap talk, policy 
transparency, both cheap talk and policy transparency or economic 
transparency yield improvements in the direction of the Ramsey 
equilibrium under the discretionary policy regime. Our findings suggest 
that these mechanisms have only small or transitory effects on welfare. 
Surprisingly, the real effects of supply shocks are better mitigated by a 
commitment regime than by any discretionary policy. Thus, we find that 
there is no trade-off between flexibility and credibility. 
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1. Introduction 
Should central bankers commit to a consistent monetary policy or should they be afforded discretion to 
alter monetary policy depending on current circumstances?  This question, as first posed by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) and elaborated upon by Barro and Gordon (1983ab) continues to be debated in discussions 
of monetary policy design.  On the one hand, the ability to use monetary policy to flexibly respond to 
various economic shocks as they arise is the main argument in favor of discretionary policy (e.g., Blinder 
(1999)).  On the other hand, it is well known that the ability to commit to a consistent policy course of 
action or rule can yield welfare improvements over a pure discretionary policy regime through the effect 
that the commitment policy has on private sector expectations (e.g., Taylor (1999)).  The latter argument 
hinges on the reputation that central bankers can achieve from consistently applying a low inflation 
monetary policy and thus envisions a repeated game setting between the policy maker and the private sector.   
In this paper we implement a version of this repeated policy game due to Barro and Gordon in the 
laboratory with paid human subjects playing the role of the central banker and the private sector.  We have 
several aims in mind.   First, we wish to explore whether reputational considerations can serve as a substitute 
for commitment in a repeated game setting where central bankers lack a commitment device and are free 
to alter monetary policy each period conditioning on realizations of economic shocks. We compare that 
flexible, discretionary regime with a commitment regime where central bankers have the ability to pre-
commit to a course for monetary policy in advance of the formation of private sector expectations, but no 
flexibility for stabilizing the economy.1  Our experimental findings from these two regimes reveal that 
reputation is indeed a poor substitute for commitment in that inflation is higher and welfare is lower in the 
discretionary environment as compared with the commitment regime. Given that finding, our second goal 
is to evaluate various mechanisms that have been suggested to be useful for overcoming the temptation to 
succumb to high inflation time-consistent policy making in the repeated game discretionary environment. 
                                                          
1 A key advantage of conducting a laboratory experiment is that we are able to implement a commitment regime as a 
theoretical benchmark, while in more natural (i.e., non-laboratory) settings such commitment devices may have 
credibility problems. 
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In particular, we explore the role of cheap talk, policy transparency, both cheap talk and policy transparency, 
and finally economic transparency in overcoming the inflationary bias under discretionary policy.  Many 
of these mechanisms have been studied in the context of Barro-Gordon type monetary policy game set-ups 
(see, Geraats (2002, 2014) for surveys) and thus the environment we study is appropriate for an analysis of 
the effectiveness of such mechanisms. We find that of the various mechanisms we study, cheap talk alone 
results in some welfare improvement relative to the baseline discretionary environment, but the benefits of 
such a mechanism appear to decline with experience. In the end, we conclude that none of the various 
mechanisms we examine comes close to achieving the welfare levels of the commitment regime. These 
findings suggest that there are real welfare-reducing consequences to discretionary monetary policy. 
We adopt an experimental approach for several reasons. First and most importantly, the laboratory 
provides us with the control necessary to properly identify whether various monetary policy regimes, e.g., 
commitment versus various discretionary regimes matter, for monetary policy choices, private sector 
expectations and welfare.  The control of the laboratory enables us to choose the timing of moves and the 
information available so as to closely match the theory being tested in a manner that is not possible using 
non-experimental field data. Second, the indefinitely repeated environments we study may admit multiple 
equilibria so that equilibrium selection becomes an issue.  As Lucas (1986, p. 237) has argued, in settings 
with multiple equilibria, “it is hard to see what can advance the discussion short of assembling a collection 
of people, putting them in the situation of interest and seeing what they do.”  Finally, it is of interest to 
assess whether the theoretical predictions of the model are robust to agents who may depart in certain 
respects from the rational choice ideal.  Our experiment makes use of student subjects to play the role of 
both central bankers and private sector agents. While ideally, we would have real central bankers make 
monetary policy choices in our experiment, there are good reasons to think that our experimental findings 
nevertheless remain externally valid and relevant to the discussion of actual central bank practice.  In 
particular, there is evidence that student subjects’ behavior is often not distinct from that of “professional” 
subjects (see, e.g. Frechette (2015)).  Additionally, the literature on monetary policy emphasizes that central 
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bankers respond to monetary incentives (Walsh 1995), and our human subject central bankers are also 
incentivized to achieve good monetary policy outcomes in line with this view.  Finally, while our precise 
quantitative experimental findings might be specific to the laboratory environment and to chosen parameter 
values (e.g., the discount rate), the qualitative results from comparing treatments with each other and with 
equilibria are more likely to be robust and externally valid.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 outlines 
the one-shot and repeated Barro-Gordon model that we implement in the laboratory. Section 4 describes 
our experimental design and hypotheses and Section 5 reports on the main findings from our experiment. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related Literature 
Three prior experiments have been conducted that are related to this paper. Van Huyck et al. (1995, 
2001) implement a “peasant-dictator” game in the laboratory. In this two-player game, players are randomly 
paired, with one being designated as the peasant and the other the dictator. Pairs interact in an indefinitely 
repeated game that continues from one round to the next with probability 5/6.  Peasants decide on how 
much of their endowment of beans to eat or plant (invest) yielding new beans in the next period (if there is 
a next period). Dictators tax production and can either pre-commit to a tax rate in advance of the peasant’s 
investment (commitment regime) or decide on a tax ex-post, after investments have been made but prior to 
their realization (discretionary regime). The authors vary the endowments of the peasants and the interest 
rate earned on investments.2  They report that reputation is an imperfect substitute for commitment and that 
efficiency under discretion is positively associated with the interest rate earned on investment.   
Arifovic and Sargent (2003) implement an experimental version of the Kydland-Prescott model using 
a design that is similar to our own. In their study subjects are divided up between policymakers and private 
                                                          
2 They report that while they tried a treatment where the dictator made cheap talk announcements of intended tax 
rates (as we do here) they were dissatisfied with the results of this treatment and dropped it from their analysis. 
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sector forecasters with one policymaker and 3-5 private sector forecasters in each indefinitely lived match.  
Private sector forecasters move first: their objective is to correctly forecast next period’s inflation. These 
inflation expectations then enter into a Phillips curve relation that determines the extent to which 
unemployment departs from its natural rate. The central bank moves second.  It has noisy control over the 
actual inflation rate and seeks to minimize its expected loss from the equal weighted sum of the square of 
the unemployment and inflation rates.  Arifovic and Sargent study only a discretionary regime and their 
treatment variables primarily consist of changes in the variance of shocks to the Phillips curve and inflation 
setting policy rule. By contrast with Van Huyck et al. they report that subjects do learn to coordinate on the 
first best Ramsey equilibrium consistent with a commitment regime, despite operating in a pure 
discretionary environment – that is they find that reputation does work as a substitute for commitment. In 
particular, they report that in three fourths of their sessions, policymakers eventually learn the Ramsey zero-
inflation policy and stay with that policy for some time, though in several of the economies they report 
some “backsliding” toward the less efficient Nash equilibrium associated with one-shot pure discretionary 
regime after the Ramsey equilibrium had been achieved and sustained for some time. 
Arifovic (2014) studies a version of the Kydland-Prescott model found in Arifovic et al. (2010) where 
the central bank makes cheap talk announcements about inflation in advance of private sector expectation 
formation and the private sector consists either of non-believers, or in a second treatment, non-believers 
and believers. The only experimental (human subjects) in this study are the non-believers. Both the central 
bank and the believer private sector agents are automated robot players who either learn over time in an 
evolutionary manner (the central bank) or blindly follow the central bank’s pronouncements (the private 
sector believers). Arifovic’s main finding is that with non-believers (human subjects) only or non-believers 
and believers (both human and robot private sector players) actual inflation levels lie below the one-shot 
Nash equilibrium prediction, though inflation is more volatile in the nonbeliever, humans-only, treatment.  
Our experiment complements and builds upon these earlier experimental studies but differs from them 
in several respects.  First, the Barro-Gordon (1983ab) model that we implement in the laboratory differs 
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from the tax policy focus of the Van Huyck et al. study and differs in certain timing respects from the 
Kydland and Prescott model of monetary policy studied by Arifovic and Sargent (2003) and Arifovic 
(2014). For example, in the model we study, the central banker always learns inflation forecasts in advance 
of setting policy whereas in the Arifovic-Sargent study private forecasts are only known to policymakers 
ex-post.  Also differently from Arifovic and Sargent, both policymakers and forecasters in our study are 
fully informed of the model economy, and subjects can play both roles over the course of an experimental 
session. By contrast with Arifovic (2014), we have no robot (or automated) players.  Similar to Van Huyck 
et al. we study the case of both commitment and discretion. However we go beyond these two policy 
regimes and examine choices under the discretionary regime when 1) the policymaker can engage in pre-
play cheap talk about intended policy choices as in Arifovic (2014) but with real human subjects making 
those announcements; 2) policy choices are made transparent to the private sector at the end of each period, 
3) there is both pre-game cheap talk and ex-post monetary policy transparency and 4) there is a regime of 
economic transparency where the private sector is informed about an economically relevant supply shock 
prior to forming their expectations (the policymaker is always informed of this shock in advance of setting 
policy). Thus our experiment goes beyond a comparison of repeated discretionary decision-making versus 
commitment and begins the important work of evaluating a number of non-reputation-based mechanisms 
by which it is thought that central bankers might overcome the inflation bias that is possible in the repeated 
but discretionary environments in which they operate. 
Our paper is also related to experimental work involving the Stackelberg leadership model as our game 
always involves sequential moves though our treatments vary whether the first mover is the central bank or 
the private sector.  Experimental research suggests that a sequential move, Stackelberg leadership structure 
yields higher welfare than does the comparable, simultaneous move (Cournot) model –see, e.g., Offerman 
et al. (2001).  However, that study and other sequential move experimental games are not typically studied 
in indefinite-horizon environments as in this paper.  
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Cheap talk has also been explored by experimentalists as a mechanism for solving equilibrium 
coordination problems (see Crawford (1998) for a survey).  Duffy and Feltovich (2006) report on 
experiments where the truthfulness of prior cheap talk messages (the extent of lying) can be evaluated by 
the receivers of those messages as in our policy transparency treatment.  However, once again, that study 
and most other studies of pre-play communication have not been conducted in indefinitely repeated games 
where communication might help solve coordination problems arising from folk-theorem results.  An 
exception is Camera et al. 2011 who study indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games where free-form 
or structured pre-play communication is allowed at various intervals in the supergame.  Similar to our 
findings, Camera et al. (2011) report that such communication does not do very much to help subjects 
achieve the most efficient equilibrium possible as subjects use communication for both benevolent and 
deceptive purposes.   
3. The Model 
The model economy we implement in the laboratory is a version of that used by Barro and Gordon 
(1983ab).  We begin with the static version before moving to the repeated (dynamic) version.  Within the 
static environment we consider first the case of discretion and then the case of commitment. 
3.1 Static model 
     The unemployment rate, 𝑦, is determined according to a Lucas-style aggregate supply function 
𝑦 = 𝑦𝑛 − 𝑐(𝜋 − 𝜋
𝑒) + 𝑢, 
where 𝑦𝑛 denotes the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), 𝜋 denotes the time t 
inflation rate, 𝜋𝑒 denotes private sector expectations of the inflation rate at time t, c is a constant and 𝑢 is a 
mean zero random supply shock. This supply function can be derived from the expectations-augmented 
Phillips curve view of the inflation-output tradeoff and implies that output and unemployment deviate from 
their natural rates only in response to unanticipated inflation. The central bank’s monetary policy consists 
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of its choice of  𝑚, denoting the rate of growth of the money supply, which determines the actual inflation 
rate according to: 
𝜋 = 𝑚 + 𝑣, 
where 𝑣 is a mean zero policy disturbance term (e.g., due to changes in the velocity of money or an 
unanticipated demand shock). The model is closed under the assumption that the private sector has rational 
expectations, so that 𝜋𝑒 = 𝐸(𝜋) and that the central bank seeks to minimize the time t loss function 
𝐸𝐿 = 𝐸(𝑏(𝜋 − 𝜋∗)2 + (𝑦 − 𝑦∗)2) , 
where EL denotes the expected loss, 𝜋∗is the central bank’s desired inflation rate and 𝑦∗ < 𝑦𝑛 denotes the 
central bank’s desired unemployment rate which is assumed to be smaller than the NAIRU. 
In the discretionary regime, the private sector moves first forming their expectations for inflation, 𝜋𝑒. The 
central bank is informed of these expectations and takes them as given when minimizing 𝐿 subject to the 
expressions for 𝑦 and 𝜋. The central bank’s reaction function, given the private sector’s expectations for 
inflation, 𝜋𝑒 , is given by: 
𝑚 =
𝑏𝜋∗+𝑐(𝑦𝑛−𝑦
∗+𝑢)+𝑐2𝜋𝑒
𝑏+𝑐2
.        (1) 
The private sector is assumed to have rational expectations about inflation and we distinguish whether or 
not the private sector is informed about supply shocks when forming those expectations. If the private sector 
cannot observe supply shocks, we have that 𝜋𝑒 = 𝐸(𝜋) = 𝐸(𝑚) =
𝑏𝜋∗+𝑐(𝑦𝑛−𝑦
∗)+𝑐2𝜋𝑒
𝑏+𝑐2
, or that 𝜋𝑒 = 𝜋∗ +
𝑐
𝑏
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗), which implies that the money supply in Nash equilibrium is: 
𝑚𝑁𝐸 = 𝜋∗ +
𝑐
𝑏
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗) +
𝑐
𝑏+𝑐2
𝑢 = 𝜋𝑁𝐸 +
𝑐
𝑏+𝑐2
𝑢. 
Thus the policy choice in the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the one-shot discretionary environment involves an 
inflation rate, 𝜋𝑁𝐸 , that is greater than the desired level, 𝜋∗, by the amount  
𝑐
𝑏
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗), which reflects the 
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well-known inflationary bias of discretionary policy.  The third and final term, 
𝑐
𝑏+𝑐2
𝑢, reflects the central 
bank’s incentive for stabilizing employment by adjusting the money supply to supply shocks, 𝑢.  
     If the central bank releases its information about supply shocks to the private sector before the formation 
of expectations,  then 𝜋𝑒 = 𝐸(𝜋|𝑢) = 𝐸(𝑚|𝑢), which implies 𝜋𝑒 = 𝜋∗ +
𝑐
𝑏
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢) and  
  𝑚𝐸𝑇 = 𝜋∗ +
𝑐
𝑏
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢) = 𝜋𝑁𝐸 +
𝑐
𝑏
𝑢. 
We refer to this regime as one of “economic transparency” (ET) and in our experiment we will compare 
welfare under economic transparency with welfare under the pure (no economic transparency) discretionary 
and commitment regimes. As is well known from Geraats (2002, 2014), a discretionary regime with 
economic transparency combines a lack of credibility with a lack of flexibility since any policy responses 
of monetary policy to supply shocks are perfectly foreseen and, therefore cannot affect employment. The 
inflation bias in the discretionary regime with economic transparency is the same as in the discretionary 
regime without economic transparency, but the monetary policy response to supply shocks, is larger when 
there is economic transparency, causing a higher variation of inflation rates without stabilizing employment.  
The reason why the money supply responds so strongly to supply shocks is due to timing: the CB responds 
to private sector expectations that have already responded to the supply shock. Consequently, the total 
impact of shocks on inflation gets magnified under economic transparency. This regime combines time-
inconsistent levels of inflation with time-inconsistent responses to shocks. 
     We next consider the commitment regime. In this environment the central bank moves first and pre-
commits to set m in advance of private sector expectation formation but may be able to condition this 
decision on realizations of the shock,  𝑢𝑡. The central bank assumes that the private sector forms rational 
expectations, 𝜋𝑒 = 𝐸(𝜋|𝑚) = 𝑚. Thus in this setting, the central bank’s minimization problem is: 
min𝑚  𝐸[𝑏(𝑚 + 𝑣 − 𝜋
∗)2 + (𝑦𝑛 − 𝑐(𝑚 + 𝑣 − 𝜋
𝑒) + 𝑢 − 𝑦∗)2|𝑢],  s.t. 𝜋𝑒 = 𝑚. 
The solution, which we refer to as the one-shot commitment (C) equilibrium is given by 𝑚𝐶 = 𝜋∗. 
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     Under commitment, the central bank cannot create surprise inflation. Hence, it cannot stabilize the real 
economy and so its best policy is to target the optimal inflation rate irrespective of the supply shock. 
Comparing this case to the Nash equilibrium under economic transparency, both problems of time 
inconstancy are solved by the CB’s ability to commit: inflation is both stable and at the optimal level. In 
comparison to the discretionary regime without economic transparency, however, we observe that while 
there is no inflationary bias, as  𝜋∗ < 𝜋𝑁𝐸, the inability to stabilize the real sector under commitment causes 
welfare losses that can be avoided under discretion.3  This reflects the well-known trade-off between 
credibility and flexibility of monetary policy. This trade-off can be mitigated in the repeated (dynamic 
game) model where the private sector can condition its behavior on the central bank’s past responses to 
supply shocks, so that reputational considerations come into play.  We now turn our attention to that setting.  
3.2 Dynamic model 
     Our experiment implements a dynamic repeated-game version of the model described in the previous 
section.  In each period of this dynamic game, the central bank has the option to exploit low inflationary 
expectations by surprising the private sector with an unexpected high inflation which reduces 
unemployment and raises welfare in that period.  However, unexpected high inflation can trigger a rise in 
future expectations about inflation which is to the central bank’s disadvantage.  Thus, the central bank has 
an incentive to keep inflation low, in order to maintain low inflationary expectations. Whether or not long-
term reputational considerations for low inflation dominate short-term welfare gains from surprise inflation 
depends on parameters and on the effect of current inflation on future expectations. The highest incentive 
to keep inflation low arises if expectations are driven up forever.  Here, we focus on conditions under which 
the efficient outcome, where  𝜋𝑡
𝑒 = 𝜋∗, can be sustained as an equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. 
In the repeated game, the central bank’s objective is to 
                                                          
3 Whether the benefit from a flexible policy response to such shocks outweighs the costs arising from the 
inflationary bias of discretionary policy depends, of course, on the parameterization of the model. 
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𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑚𝑡}𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛿
𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
[𝑏(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)2 + (𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦
∗)2|𝑢𝑡] 
subject to the given processes for 𝜋𝑡 and 𝑦𝑡.  Depending on the information available to the private sector, 
e.g., whether they learn ex-post about the policy rule m(u), and provided that the discount factor 𝛿 is 
sufficiently large, the Folk theorem for infinitely repeated games applies so that the set of equilibria ranges 
from the one-period discretionary Nash equilibrium where 𝑚𝑡 = 𝜋
𝑁𝐸 +
𝑐
𝑏+𝑐2
𝑢𝑡 and private sector 
expectations satisfy 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 = 𝜋𝑁𝐸  to the efficient “Ramsey” solution where the central bank sets 𝑚𝑡 = 𝜋
∗ +
𝑐
𝑏+𝑐2
𝑢𝑡, avoiding the inflation bias, because 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 = 𝜋∗, but at the same time having the flexibility to stabilize 
employment.  As this environment involves a multiplicity of equilibria with no clear means of choosing 
from among this set of equilibria, a laboratory experiment can be informative as to which equilibria agents 
are likely to coordinate on and under what conditions.  
Before turning to the experimental design, we will briefly derive the conditions for the Ramsey solution 
being equilibrium of the repeated game. We assume throughout that the private sector will learn inflation 
𝜋𝑡 and unemployment 𝑦𝑡 at the end of the period. Knowing the Phillips curve, it can thereby deduce the 
supply shock 𝑢𝑡. We need to distinguish, though, whether or not the private sector will get informed about 
the actual policy 𝑚𝑡 and thereby the transmission shock 𝑣𝑡.  
If policy is transparent (as assumed by Barro and Gordon (1983b)), expectations in period t+1 can be 
conditioned on the actual relationship between 𝑚𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡. The strongest incentive for the central bank to 
pursue the Ramsey rule is supported by a grim trigger strategy played by private sector agents in which 
their expectations are initially 𝜋0
𝑒 = 𝜋∗ in the first period and remain there, as long as the central bank 
follows the Ramsey rule. If, however, the central bank deviates from this policy in any period 𝜏, the private 
sector’s expectations immediately jump towards the one-period Nash equilibrium 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 = 𝜋𝑁𝐸 for all 𝑡 > 𝜏, 
and the best response for the central bank is to follow the Nash-equilibrium policy 𝑚𝑁𝐸 in all future periods. 
Thus, the central bank faces the trade-off between exploiting low expectations and raising employment for 
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one period on the one hand and implementing the maximum equilibrium inflation bias for all future periods 
as the result.  If the central bank deviates in say period 0, it should best respond to 𝜋0
𝑒 = 𝜋∗ and 𝑢0, which 
yields 𝑚0 = 𝜋
∗ +
𝑐
𝑏+𝑐2
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢0) and gives rise to a welfare loss of    
𝐿0
𝐷(𝑢0)
= 𝐸 [𝑏 (
𝑐
𝑏 + 𝑐2
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢0) + 𝑣0)
2
+ (𝑦𝑛 − 𝑐 (
𝑐
𝑏 + 𝑐2
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢0) + 𝑣0) + 𝑢0 − 𝑦
∗)
2
|𝑢0] 
           =𝑏 (
𝑐
𝑏+𝑐2
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢0))
2
+ 𝑏𝜎𝑣
2 + (
𝑏
𝑏+𝑐2
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢0))
2
+ 𝑐2𝜎𝑣
2 [skip this line in publication] 
= 
𝑏
𝑏+𝑐2
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢0)
2 + (𝑏 + 𝑐2)𝜎𝑣
2 .   
The expected welfare loss associated with a deviation from Ramsey is then given by 𝐿0
𝐷(𝑢0) +
∑ 𝛿𝑡∞𝑡=1 𝐸(𝐿
𝑁𝐸), where 𝐸(𝐿𝑁𝐸) is the prior expected welfare loss in the one-period Nash-equilibrium: 
  𝐸(𝐿𝑁𝐸) = 𝐸 [𝑏 (
𝑐
𝑏
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗) +
𝑐
𝑏+𝑐2
𝑢 + 𝑣)
2
+ (𝑦𝑛 − 𝑐 (
𝑐
𝑏+𝑐2
𝑢 + 𝑣) + 𝑢 − 𝑦∗)
2
] 
               = 
𝑏+𝑐2
𝑏
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗)2 +
𝑐2
𝑏+𝑐2
𝜎𝑢
2 + (𝑏 + 𝑐2)𝜎𝑣
2 .  
This must be compared with the expected welfare loss if the central bank follows the Ramsey rule. In the 
first period, this loss is given by  
 𝐿𝑅(𝑢0) = 𝐸 [𝑏 (
𝑐
𝑏+𝑐2
𝑢0 + 𝑣0)
2
+ (𝑦𝑛 − 𝑐 (
𝑐
𝑏+𝑐2
𝑢0 + 𝑣0) + 𝑢0 − 𝑦
∗)
2
|𝑢0] 
= 𝑏 (
𝑐
𝑏+𝑐2
𝑢0)
2
+ 𝑏𝜎𝑣
2 + (𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ +
𝑏
𝑏+𝑐2
𝑢0)
2
+ 𝑐2𝜎𝑣
2  [skip this line in publication] 
= (𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗)2 +
𝑏
𝑏+𝑐2
(𝑢0
2 + 2𝑢0(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗)) + (𝑏 + 𝑐2)𝜎𝑣
2 . 
The period-0 expectation of future losses under Ramsey is   
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  𝐸(𝐿𝑅) = 𝐸 [𝑏 (
𝑐
𝑏+𝑐2
𝑢 + 𝑣)
2
+ (𝑦𝑛 − 𝑐 (
𝑐
𝑏+𝑐2
𝑢 + 𝑣) + 𝑢 − 𝑦∗)
2
]  
             = (𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗)2 +
𝑐2
𝑏+𝑐2
𝜎𝑢
2 + (𝑏 + 𝑐2)𝜎𝑣
2 . 
Thus, the central bank has no incentive to deviate, if and only if 𝐿0
𝐷(𝑢0) + ∑ 𝛿
𝑡∞
𝑡=1 𝐸(𝐿
𝑁𝐸)  ≥ 𝐿0
𝑅(𝑢0) +
∑ 𝛿𝑡∞𝑡=1 𝐸(𝐿
𝑅), which is equivalent to  
𝑏
𝑏 + 𝑐2
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢0)
2 − (𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗)2 −
𝑏
𝑏 + 𝑐2
(𝑢0
2 + 2𝑢0(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗)) ≥ ∑ 𝛿𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
[−
𝑐2
𝑏
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗)2] 
⟺
−𝑐2
𝑏+𝑐2
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗)2 ≥
−𝛿
1−𝛿
⋅
𝑐2
𝑏
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗)2 ⟺ (1 − 𝛿)𝑏 ≤ 𝛿(𝑏 + 𝑐2) ⟺ 𝛿 ≥
𝑏
2𝑏+𝑐2
.       (1) 
This condition is necessary and sufficient for the Ramsey solution to be an equilibrium under transparent 
monetary policy. 
If policy is intransparent, the private sector cannot perfectly infer whether an increase in inflation is 
due to the central bank’s deviating from the Ramsey rule or to an unfortunate realization of the transmission 
shock 𝑣𝑡. Here, the parameter restrictions that support the Ramsey equilibrium depend on the distribution 
of both shocks.  In our experiment, we will use uniform distributions with bounded support. This allows us 
to derive a sufficient condition under which the Ramsey solution is an equilibrium.4  
Suppose 𝑣 has a uniform distribution in [−𝜇, 𝜇] and consider the following strategy of forecasters: 
Expectations start with Ramsey and switch to Nash forever from period 𝑡 + 1 onwards, if 𝜋𝑡 > 𝜋
∗ + 𝜇. As 
long as the central bank plays Ramsey, the probability of expectations switching to Nash is zero. However, 
the central bank may raise the money supply just enough to exploit the large marginal gains for reducing 
                                                          
4 Henckel et al. (2011) discuss this problem for a normally distributed shock and a welfare function that is linear in 
output. They assume that expectations switch to the one-period Nash equilibrium for one period if a certain test statistic 
indicates that the central bank has been cheating with some given probability. However, the test statistic is chosen 
arbitrarily and it is assumed that the central bank does not strategically game the test statistic. Under these conditions, 
the Ramsey solution cannot be sustained as equilibrium. 
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unemployment from high levels at the risk of a moderate probability of being punished in the future. If 𝜇 is 
large, the probability of detection is small, provided that m exceeds 𝜋∗ just slightly. The CB can hide behind 
the shock, which may provide an incentive for deviations from Ramsey. For deriving a sufficient condition 
that prevents such incentives, first note that the marginal gain from increasing employment in the current 
period is a concave function of the money supply due to the quadratic loss function. The marginal expected 
future loss stemming from the probability of being detected, however, is linear due to the uniform 
distribution of transmission shocks.  
If the money supply rises to 𝑚 ∈ (𝜋∗, 𝜋∗ + 2𝜇), the probability of being detected is 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜋 >  𝜋∗ + 𝜇|𝑚) =
𝑚−𝜋∗ 
2𝜇
.5 The associated expected welfare loss in the current period, say 𝜏 = 0, is  
 𝐸(𝐿|𝑢0, 𝑚) = 𝐸[𝑏(𝑚 + 𝑣 − 𝜋
∗)2 + (𝑦𝑛 − 𝑐(𝑚 + 𝑣 − 𝜋
∗) + 𝑢0 − 𝑦
∗)2|𝑢0] 
= 𝑏(𝑚 − 𝜋∗)2 + 𝑏𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝑐2(𝑚 − 𝜋∗)2 − 2𝑐(𝑚 − 𝜋∗)(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢0) + (𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢0)
2 + 𝑐2𝜎𝑣
2 [skip] 
= (𝑏 + 𝑐2)(𝑚 − 𝜋∗)2 − 2𝑐(𝑚 − 𝜋∗)(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢0) + (𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢0)
2 + (𝑏+𝑐2)𝜎𝑣
2. 
Thus, the marginal expected gain from increasing m is  
− ∂E(𝐿|𝑢0,𝑚)
∂m
= 2𝑐(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢0) −
2(𝑏 + 𝑐2)(𝑚 − 𝜋∗). The marginal expected loss is  
1 
2𝜇
∑ 𝛿𝑡∞𝑡=1 (𝐸(𝐿
𝑁𝐸 − 𝐿𝑅)) =
𝛿
1−𝛿
⋅
𝑐2
2𝜇 𝑏
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗)2. A 
marginal deviation from Ramsey does not pay off, if and only if 
2𝑐(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ − 𝑢0) ≤
𝛿
1−𝛿
⋅
𝑐2
2𝜇 𝑏
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗)2 ⇔ 4𝜇 𝑏(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ − 𝑢0) ≤
𝛿
1−𝛿
⋅ 𝑐(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗)2. 
Clearly, the incentive for inflating the economy rises with larger supply shocks. Since we assume a 
bounded support, a sufficient condition preventing deviations from Ramsey is    
                                                          
5 If money supply is larger, the deviation from Ramsey will be detected for sure. Condition (1) ensures that this is 
not in the interest of the central bank.   
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 4𝜇 𝑏(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥) ≤
𝛿
1−𝛿
⋅ 𝑐(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗)2       
⟺ (1 − 𝛿)4𝜇 𝑏(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥) ≤ 𝛿𝑐(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗)2   [skip this line in publication] 
⟺ 4𝜇 𝑏(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ + 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥) ≤ 𝛿[𝑐(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗)2 + 4𝜇 𝑏(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗ − 𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛)] [skip this line in publication] 
 ⟺ 𝛿 ≥
4𝜇 𝑏(𝑦𝑛−𝑦
∗+𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥)
𝑐(𝑦𝑛−𝑦∗)2+4𝜇 𝑏(𝑦𝑛−𝑦∗+𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥)
,            (2) 
where 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the largest possible realization of the adverse supply shock. In the experiment, we will 
make sure that Conditions (1) and (2) hold. 
4. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
Our experimental design consists of six different treatments that vary in the timing of moves and in the 
information available to participants.  However, across all treatments, a number of factors were held 
constant and we begin with this basic structure.   
4.1 Baseline Design 
     Each session of a given treatment involved 20 subjects with no prior experience with this experiment. 
The experiment was conducted over networked computers and was programmed using the z-Tree software 
(Fischbacher 2007).  At the start of each session, subjects were randomly divided up into two matching 
groups of size 10. Subjects in different matching groups never interacted with each other and thus each 
matching group (2 per session) consistutes an independent observation.    A session for each matching group 
consists of a number of repeated games known as “sequences” with each sequence consisting of an 
unknown number of rounds.   
     At the start of each new sequence, subjects in each matching group were randomly divided up into two 
groups of size 5 and the composition of the group remained constant for all rounds of the sequence. Prior 
to play of the first round of each sequence, one member of each group was randomly selected to play the 
role of the central banker, known as the “type A” player, while the other four members of each group were 
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assigned to play the role of the private sector, known as “type B” players.6 Subjects remained in the same 
role in all rounds of a given supergame. At the start of each new sequence, groups were randomly formed 
anew and the type A player was again randomly chosen from among the membership of the new group, so 
that there is turnover of central bankers in our environment.  
     To avoid triggering any pre-conceived notions of the proper role or choices to be made by each player 
type, we used neutral language and a neutral framing of the model. For instance we did not want players to 
imagine they were central bankers choosing an inflation rate because they might have used their own 
experience from the real economy to coordinate on a particular rate, and we wanted the incentive structure 
of the model to determine their decisions instead.      
     We told subjects to imagine that the two variables, 𝑦𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡, stand for two “containers” holding varying 
amounts of water7.  Subjects were instructed that at the start of each round t =1,2,…, container 1 
(unemployment) held 𝑤𝑡 “gallons” (“liters”) of water where 𝑤𝑡 was publicly known to be an i.i.d. random 
draw each period from a uniform distribution over the interval [120, 160]. The expected value, E[𝑤𝑡] =
140, corresponds to the NAIRU, 𝑦𝑛, in the model while the supply shock 𝑢𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡 − E[𝑤𝑡].  Thus, in our 
parameterization one can think of the adverse supply shock, 𝑢𝑡, as an i.i.d. random draw from a uniform 
distribution with support [-20, 20] and thus having mean 0 and standard deviation 20 √3⁄ =11.55. The 
initial amount of water in Container 1 (unemployment) thus consists of both the NAIRU and the adverse 
supply shock, i.e., 𝑤𝑡 = 𝑦𝑛 + 𝑢𝑡.  The timing of when or whether players learned the value of 𝑤𝑡 is an 
important element of our treatments.  Subjects were further instructed that Container 2 (inflation) was 
initially empty.  
                                                          
6 Our choice of having a single central banker and a larger “private sector” of four players follows the setup of 
Arifovic and Sargent (2003) and reflects that fact that the private sector is considerably larger than the government 
sector. 
7 The idea of framing a monetary policy game in terms of targeting amounts of water or chips in a container has 
been used first by Engle-Warnick and Turdaliev (2010). 
16 
 
     In our baseline, discretionary policy treatment, the timing of moves was as follows. The four type B 
players in each economy moved first each submitting a forecast, 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 , as to how many gallons (liters) of 
water would be in Container 2 at the end of round t. They did so without knowing the realized value of 𝑤𝑡, 
though they did know that 𝑤𝑡 was an i.i.d. random draw from a uniform distribution on the interval [120, 
160] and they were told that E[𝑤𝑡] = 140. They were also informed about the player A’s objective function 
(as described below), so they knew the Player A’s (central bank’s) target values for inflation, 𝜋∗,  and 
unemployment, 𝑦∗. After all four Player Bs had made their forecasts, the computer program calculated the 
mean forecast 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 =
1
4
∑ 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝑒  4𝑖=1 for the economy/group and revealed this value to the group’s Player A – 
this forecast corresponds to 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 in the model.  Subjects were instructed that this average forecast value would 
be added to the amount of water that was already in Container 1, so that the amount of water in Container 
1 now increased to 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡
𝑒. Then, the player A alone in each group learned the value of both 𝑤𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 
and the sum 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 , representing the new total amount of water in Container 1. Player A was then 
instructed to “move” some amount 𝑚 ∈ [0,80] of water from Container 1 to Container 2. This choice 
corresponds to the policy choice of 𝑚𝑡 for period t.  In the baseline discretionary treatment, Player Bs do 
not observe Player A’ choice for 𝑚𝑡 but it is public knowledge that 𝑚 ∈ [0,80].  In addition, it was public 
knowledge to both player types that there was a random, uncontrolled flow of water, 𝑣𝑡, from Container 1 
to Container 2, corresponding to the policy transmission shock of the theory.  The value of 𝑣𝑡 was publicly 
known to be an independent random draw each period from a uniform distribution having support [0, 40] 
and all subjects were instructed that 𝐸[𝑣𝑡] = 20. Note that differently from the theory, the transmission 
shock is not mean zero; this choice was made because the policy action space was 𝑚 ∈ [0,80], and we did 
not want to have inflation 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑚 + 𝑣𝑡 be negative. Player As do not observe the value of 𝑣𝑡 until after 
they have chosen 𝑚𝑡. 
     At the end of each period t, the final amount of water in Container 1 is thus given by 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 − 𝑚𝑡 −
𝑣𝑡, which correlates to the Phillips curve relationship, in which surprise inflation reduces unemployment. 
Setting the parameter of the Phillips curve 𝑐 = −1, as we do in all treatments of our experiment, we have 
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that the final amount of water in Container 1 corresponds to 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑛 + 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 − 𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡  while the final amount 
of water in Container 2 corresponds to 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡 .   
     The final amounts of water in Containers 1 and 2 were revealed to all subjects in each economy of size 
5 at the end of each period as these amounts determined the subjects’ payoffs for the round.  Specifically, 
each player type was incentivized to make choices consistent with the objective functions posited by the 
theory. Type A players were instructed that their point earnings were given by the formula: 
Player A Points = 6000 – 2 (Final Container 1 amount – 120)2 – (Final Container 2 amount – 40)2. 
Thus, Player A’s (central bankers) had as their policy objectives: 𝑦∗ = 120 and 𝜋∗ = 40 and the parameter 
b was set equal to ½. As noted above, the payoff function and the parameter choices for Player As were 
public knowledge to all participants as revealed in the written instructions.  Type B players were instructed 
that their point earnings were given by the formula: 
Player B Points = 4000 – (𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝑒  – Final Container 2 amount)2. 
Thus, Player B’s had the simpler task of just forecasting the value for 𝜋𝑡, the amount of water in Container 
2 correctly.8 For this reason, the maximum number of points that Player Bs could earn each round was 
4,000, while Player A’s, who had the more difficult decision, could earn a maximum of 6,000 points per 
round.  These equations determining players’ points were presented to both player types and for ease of 
understanding, subjects were given payoff tables showing how their choices would convert into points each 
                                                          
8 The realized levels of inflation and unemployment do not enter into the payoff functions of forecasters, only the 
payoff functions of the central bankers. We are assuming that inflation forecast accuracy is all that matters to 
forecasters; given accurate inflation forecasts these agent would be able to infer the level of unemployment (output) 
from knowledge of the model and solve any profit or utility maximizing problems that they faced. Restricting 
private sector agents to forming inflation forecasts alone (a “learning to forecast” design) also limits such agents’ 
incentives to affect aggregate variables such as unemployment and inflation which they might otherwise have 
incentives to influence given the small group sizes of the economies that we study. Thus our restriction that private 
sector agents provide forecasts only is also consistent with standard assumptions of perfectly competitive behaviour 
by private sector agents. 
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round. The experimental instructions including these payoff tables and other details about what subjects 
were told are provided in the Appendix. The parameterization of the model is justified in section 4.3. 
     At the end of each round, all subjects are informed of the final amounts of water in the two containers 
corresponding to the realizations of 𝑦𝑡  and 𝜋𝑡 and their point earnings for the round as determined by the 
expressions given above. In addition, type B players learn the realization of 𝑤𝑡 = 𝑦𝑛 + 𝑢𝑡. As they were 
told at the outset that the mean value for 𝑤𝑡 = 140 = 𝑦𝑛, in effect they learn the realization of the supply 
shock 𝑢𝑡 at the end of the period.  Whether type B players learn the central banker’s choice for 𝑚𝑡 depends 
on the treatment as detailed below 
     Subjects were instructed that at the end of each round that a six-sided die would be rolled to determine 
whether the sequence continued with another round; they were further instructed that if a six was rolled, 
the sequence ended but otherwise the sequence would continue with another round.  This constant random 
continuation probability implements both discounting with factor 𝛿 =
5
6
 and the stationarity associated with 
an infinite horizon. Subjects were instructed that, depending on the time remaining in the session, a new 
indefinite sequence might begin. 
     Subjects were informed that at the end of the session (which could last up to three hours), two sequences 
would be randomly chosen from among all those played and subjects point earnings from the chosen 
sequences would be converted into cash at a known and fixed rate.  In addition, at the start of each sequence 
subjects were endowed with 5,000 points to avoid negative payoffs; since two sequences were randomly 
drawn at the end, the endowment served as subjects’ show-up payment. 
4.2 Treatments 
Our experiment consists of six different treatments that are intended to explore the role (if any) played 
by reputation, cheap talk and transparency (both policy and economic) on welfare in the repeated 
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discretionary environment relative to an environment where central banks can pre-commit to monetary 
policy.  The six treatments are: 
1. Discretionary policy: The timing and moves for this baseline treatment are as described in Section 4.1. 
The private sector, type Bs, move first and are not informed of the realization of the supply shock 𝑢𝑡 when 
forming their expecations, 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 .  The policy maker observes 𝑢𝑡  and 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 and then chooses 𝑚𝑡 .  Type Bs never 
learn the value of  𝑚𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑡, but they do learn the final amounts of water in each container, 𝑦𝑡and 𝜋𝑡 and 
are informed of the values for 𝑢𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 at the end of the period. 
2. Commitment: In this treatment, the central banker, Type A moves first, observing the realization of the 
supply shock, 𝑢𝑡  and then choosing 𝑚𝑡  prior to the formation of inflationary expectations by the private 
sector.  Thus the commitment environment we study provides the central banker with the ability to respond 
to supply shocks but also to pre-commit to an inflation policy for the period.   
3. Cheap talk (CT): In this treatment, Type A players again move first, observing the value of the supply 
shock 𝑢𝑡 and then choose a message of the form: “The amount of water I intend to move from Container 1 
to Container 2 is __.”  In the blank space they enter the value of 𝑚 ∈ [0,80] that they want to signal to 
forecasters in that round. This message is sent to all Player Bs in their group. Then the Player Bs form their 
forecasts of inflation for the period, 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 . Recall that Player Bs understand that the final amount of water in 
Container 1, 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡 , so the announcement concerning the intended choice for 𝑚𝑡 can play a role in 
coordinating private sector inflationary expectations. To ensure that the message is understood to be cheap 
talk, subjects are further instructed that “it is up to Player A whether he or she moves as much water as 
previously announced. Player A can move the announced amount or more or less water.” 
4. Policy transparency (PT): This treatment has the same timing as the baseline discretionary treatment. 
The only difference is that the private sector Type B players learn the realizations of both 𝑚𝑡  and 𝑣𝑡 at the 
end of each round, thus making it transparent as to whether inflation was high (low) due to the transmission 
shock or due to the policymaker’s choice. A transparent policy environment such as in this and the next 
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treatment (cheap talk plus policy transparency) makes it easier to sustain the Ramsey solution as equilibrium 
of the repeated game. 
5. Cheap talk and policy transparency (CT+PT): This treatment combines the cheap talk phase of the 
cheap talk treatment with the information revealed about monetary policy (𝑚𝑡  and 𝑣𝑡) at the end of each 
round as in the policy transparency treatment.  This treatment thus allows the private sector to evaluate the 
truthfulness of the central bank’s cheap talk announcements providing a potentially more credible means 
by which the central bank can attempt to manage private sector expectations as compared with cheap talk 
or policy transparency by themselves. 
6. Economic transparency (ET): In this treatment, the private sector (Player Bs) learn the value of the 
supply shock 𝑢𝑡 at the same time that the central banker (Player A) learns it, and prior to forming 
expectations of inflation for the period. The timing and information is otherwise identical to that of the 
discretionary treatment. 
4.3 Calibration and Interpretation  
     Parameter choices had to satisfy different requirements: subjects must be able to comprehend the relation 
between different variables, the different equilibria should be sufficiently differentiated, allowing us to 
detect treatment effects and potentially reject hypotheses, the parameters should allow for an interpretation 
as a monetary policy game, the continuation probability should allow for several sequences per session and 
also satisfy the conditions for the Ramsey solution to be an equilibrium. While the levels of the 
unemployment and inflation target 𝑦∗ and 𝜋∗ are mere normalizations, the other parameters affect the 
interpretation. 
     We suggest that a period in the experiment corresponds to 2 years, our guess regarding the length of 
time it takes for monetary policy to have an impact on inflation and unemployment. Thus our continuation 
probability choice of 𝛿 = 5/6 means that the expected duration of a supergame (or a CB policy regime) is 
12 years and implies an annual discount rate of about 8 percent. We assume that the difference between 
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natural and efficient unemployment is 2 percent.  As we set 𝑦𝑛 = 140 and 𝑦
∗ = 120, the difference 
between efficient and natural unemployment is 20, so we may think of units of y as equaling 0.1 percent 
unemployment. We suppose that a 1 percent increase in inflation leads to a .5 percent reduction in 
unemployment.  Setting 𝑐 = 1, thus, implies that units of 𝜋 must correspond to .2 percent inflation.  Since 
the standard deviation of supply shocks u is 11.55 and a unit of y is .1 percent unemployment, the standard 
deviation of supply shocks in the experiment is about 1.15 percent unemployment. The transmission shock, 
v, also has a standard deviation of 11.55 and since a unit of 𝜋 is .2 percent inflation; the standard deviation 
of policy transmission shocks in the experiment is 2.3 percent inflation. The parameter choices with 𝑏 = .5 
also imply that the inflation bias in the one-period Nash equilibrium is 
𝑐
𝑏
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦
∗) = 40 and, since units 
of 𝜋 correspond to .2 percent inflation, corresponds to 8 percent inflation. Finally, we note that the optimal 
coefficient attached to supply shocks in the one-period Nash equilibrium and in the Ramsey solution is 
𝑐
𝑏+𝑐2
=
2
3
. Suppose that the economy is hit by a shock that would increase unemployment by 1% without 
further policy measures (𝑢 = 10). In our economy, the optimal response would be an increase of 𝜋 by 6.67 
corresponding to 1.33% inflation. This policy reduces the increase in unemployment to .67%.  
     Note that the condition for existence of a Ramsey equilibrium in the repeated game under policy 
transparency requires 𝛿 ≥
𝑏
2𝑏+𝑐2
= 0.25. With 𝜇 = 20 and 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 20 , the sufficient condition for the 
Ramsey solution to be an equilibrium in the regimes without policy transparency is 𝛿 ≥
4𝜇 𝑏(𝑦𝑛−𝑦
∗+𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥)
𝑐(𝑦𝑛−𝑦∗)2+4𝜇 𝑏(𝑦𝑛−𝑦∗+𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥)
=
40∗40
(20)2+40∗40
= 0.8. Naturally, it is more challenging than the condition 
under policy transparency. Our discount factor of 𝛿 = 5/6 satisfies both requirements. 
4.4 Experimental Hypotheses  
     Given our parameterization of the model, theory predictions are summarized in Table 1, which reports 
point predictions if all equilibria give the same predictions or upper and lower bounds for the range of 
equilibria. The commitment solution is for the CB to set 𝑚𝑡 = 𝑚 = 20 for all t since 𝐸[𝑣𝑡] =
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20, and therefore 𝐸[𝜋𝑡] = 𝑚 + 𝐸[𝑣𝑡] = 40 = 𝜋
∗. As laid out in Section  3.1, the CB should not respond 
to supply shocks, because any such response would be reflected in forecasts and, thus, not affect 
employment. It follows that inflation varies only with the transmission shock, Std[𝜋] = Std[𝑣] = 11.55, 
while the variance of unemployment is the sum of the variances of the two shocks, or 
Std[𝑦]=√Var[𝑣] + Var[𝑢] = 16.33. Expectations should be rational and equal to 𝜋∗, so that the standard 
deviation of 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 − 𝜋𝑡 should simply reflect the standard deviation of the policy transmission shock, 
Std[𝑣] = 11.55. Expected CB welfare is given by   
6000– 2𝐸((140– 120 − 𝑢 − 𝑣)2)– 𝐸(𝑣2) = 5200 − 2Var(𝑢) − 3Var(𝑣) = 4533.3.    
In the case of discretion, we have multiple equilibria ranging from the one-period Nash with an inflation 
bias of 40 to the Ramsey solution without inflation bias. In all equilibria, the CB responds to supply shocks 
and stabilizes employment with a coefficient of 𝜕𝑚 𝜕𝑢⁄ = 2/3. The same coefficient applies to the central 
bank’s response to inflation expectations, as given by the response function (1). Note however that in a 
Ramsey equilibrium forecasts are constant and, thus, there should be no detectable variation to which the 
central bank responds. As subjects are most likely not exactly in equilibrium, the best response of the central 
bank with respect to “near Ramsey” expectations might still be zero. In the Result section, we will analyze 
whether subjects respond in an optimal way to the actual decision of other players. Assuming rational 
expectations, the actual choices of m should range from 𝜋∗ − 𝐸(𝑣) +
2
3
𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 6.67 under Ramsey to 𝜋
∗ +
40 + 𝐸(𝑣) +
2
3
𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 73.33. Our subject central bankers can choose values of 𝑚 ∈ [0,80], which 
contains all of these vales in the interior, allowing us to test the point predictions associated with the most 
extreme equilibria.  
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Table 1: Equilibrium Predictions 
          Treat. 
Predict  
Commitment Discretion Cheap Talk Policy 
Transparency 
CT + PT Economic 
Transparency 
Inflation bias 0 [0,40] [0,40] [0,40] [0,40] [0,40] 
Response of 
𝑚𝑡 to supply 
shock, 𝑢𝑡 . 
0 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 
2/3 
2 * 
Response of 
𝑚𝑡 to exp 
inflation, 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 . 
n.a. 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 
Response of 
𝜋𝑡
𝑒 to supply 
shock, 𝑢𝑡 
0 n.a. 0 n.a. 0 2 
St.Dev. of 𝜋𝑡 11.55 13.88 13.88 13.88 13.88 25.82 
St. Dev. of 
𝑦𝑡  
16.33 12.17 12.17 12.17 12.17 16.33 
St. Dev. of 
(𝜋𝑡
𝑒 − 𝜋𝑡) 
11.55 13.88 13.88 13.88 13.88 11.55 
CB Welfare 4533 [3111, 4711] [3111, 4711] [3111, 4711] [3111, 4711] [2400, 4000] 
Forecasters’ 
payoffs 
3867 3807 3807 3807 3807 3867 
Note: * The response of m to the supply shock in ET should be 2/3 if the response to private expectations is 
controlled for. Since expectations respond to the supply shock as well, the total response of m to u should be 2. 
     The stabilization of employment raises the standard deviation of inflation to Std[𝜋] =
√Var[𝑣] +
4
9
Var[𝑢] = 13.88, while it reduces the standard deviation of unemployment to Std[𝑦] =
√Var[𝑣] +
1
9
Var[𝑢] = 12.17. Since inflation expectations are constant in any equilibrium, the standard 
deviation of 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 − 𝜋𝑡 should equal the standard deviation of inflation.  
     In the Ramsey equilibrium, expected CB welfare is:  
6000– 2𝐸 ((140– 120 −
1
3
𝑢 − 𝑣)
2
) – 𝐸 ((𝑣 +
2
3
𝑢)
2
) = 5200 −
6
9
Var(𝑢) − 3Var(𝑣) = 4711.1.  
In the Nash equilibrium, however, expected welfare is lower, because of the inflation bias and is given by 
6000– 2𝐸 ((140– 120 −
1
3
𝑢 − 𝑣)
2
) – 𝐸 ((40 + 𝑣 +
2
3
𝑢)
2
) = 3600 −
6
9
Var(𝑢) − 3Var(𝑣) = 3111.1. 
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Notice that the discretionary regime admits a range of possible welfare values for the CB that includes the 
commitment welfare value in its interior.  
     Policy transparency, cheap talk, and policy transparency plus cheap talk have no impact on the set of 
equilibria. While cheap talk announcements should be ignored in equilibrium, they might transmit 
information about the supply shock to the private sector, which justifies testing the equilibrium prediction 
of expectations being unresponsive to supply shocks and announcements.  
     Under economic transparency, on the other hand, the private sector learns the supply shock prior to 
forming expectations. As laid out in Section 3.1, this raises the equilibrium coefficient by which money 
supply, inflation, and inflation expectations respond to supply shocks to 𝑐 𝑏⁄ = 2 without stabilizing 
employment, which results in Std[𝜋] = √Var[𝑣] + 4Var[𝑢] = 25.82, while Std[𝑦] = 16.33 as in the 
commitment regime. Because the private sector can predict monetary policy responses to supply shocks, 
the standard deviation of  𝜋𝑡
𝑒 − 𝜋𝑡 should simply reflect the policy transmission shock, Std[𝑣] = 11.55. As 
in the baseline discretionary treatment, there is a set of equilibria, ranging from the one period Nash to a 
constrained efficient solution, in which there is no inflation bias, but no stabilization of employment either. 
Welfare in the one-period Nash is given by  
6000– 2𝐸((140– 120 − 𝑢 − 𝑣)2)– 𝐸((40 + 𝑣 + 2𝑢)2) = 3600 − 6Var(𝑢) − 3Var(𝑣) = 2400. In the 
most efficient equilibrium, welfare is   
6000– 2𝐸((140– 120 − 𝑢 − 𝑣)2)– 𝐸((𝑣 + 2𝑢)2) = 5200 − 6Var(𝑢) − 3Var(𝑣) = 4000.  
     Beside the point predictions from equilibria, we have some more fundamental hypotheses that can be 
divided up between those pertaining to CB behavior, those pertaining to the behavior of the private sector 
and aggregate outcomes involving both sets of actors. 
Central Bank Hypotheses 
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Hypothesis 1. Repetition in the discretionary regime serves as a substitute for commitment regarding 
monetary policy.   
By this we simply mean that in the repeated game the CB behaves as if s/he were operating under a 
commitment regime and (a) produces a similar average money supply. The counter-hypothesis is that a 
higher money supply arises from the inflation bias associated with the less efficient equilibria under 
discretion. (b) The second part of this hypothesis states that monetary responses to supply shocks are the 
same. Here, the counter-hypothesis comes from the positive coefficients in the equilibria of discretionary 
regimes.   
Hypothesis 2. The discretionary regimes with and without cheap talk, policy transparency, or economic 
transparency produce the same central bank behavior.   
More precisely, we test, (a) whether these treatments lead to the same average money supply and (b) to the 
same central bank responses to expected inflation and supply shocks. 
Private sector hypotheses 
Hypothesis 3: Average private sector forecasts of inflation are unbiased and the distribution of forecast 
errors reflects the unpredictable fluctuations of inflation only.   
This hypothesis follows from the assumption of rational expectations. We will test whether biases are null 
and, if not, whether they differ across treatments.  
Hypothesis 4: The distribution of individual forecasts around the average is the same across treatments.   
Theory predicts that B-players make the most precise forecasts and earn the highest payoffs in the 
commitment treatment and under economic transparency, and lower (but equal) payoffs in the other 
discretionary treatments. Besides a treatment-specific bias, individual forecast errors reflects how much 
information about economic shocks and monetary policies the B-players have when they make their 
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forecasts. We will test whether the standard deviation of average forecast errors is the same across 
treatments and how dispersed individual expecations are. While in equilibrium all agents hold the same 
expectations, in the experiment expectations will differ across subjects. These differences may be related 
to the treatment, even if the average forecast errors are the same across treatments. Related to this, the 
payoffs for type-B players might differ across treatments for three reasons: (i) there may be a systematic 
bias (cf. Hypothesis 3), (ii) average forecast errors may be more volatile in some treatments than in others 
(Std. of  𝜋𝑡
𝑒 − 𝜋𝑡) and (iii) individual forecasts may be more or less dispersed (Std. of 𝜋𝑡
𝑖 − 𝜋𝑡
𝑒).  
Hypothesis 5: Except for the economic transparency regime, inflation forecasts do not respond to supply 
shocks.  
In the baseline discretionary treatment and for policy tgransparency, B-players do not receive any 
information that might eventually depend on supply shocks. In treatments with cheap-talk, the 
announcements should be ignored and under commitment, monetary policy should not respond to supply 
shocks. The counter-hypothesis (that forecasts are affected by supply shocks under commitment or cheap 
talk) arises from possible information transmission in these treatments, if either cheap-talk announcements 
or money supply under commitment respond to these shocks.  
Finally, we have some hypotheses regarding aggregate outcomes:  
Hypothesis 6: Under commitment and economic transparency, output volatility is larger than in the other  
discretionary regimes.  
Here, we test whether output volatility is the same between ET and commitment, whether it is the same 
across the other treatments, and whether there are differnces between these two groups of treatments. 
Hypothesis 7: Compared with discretionary treatments, the standard deviaton of inflation should be 
higher under economic transparency and lower under commitment. 
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Hypothesis 8: Repetition in the discretionary regime serves as a substitute for commitment regarding 
(central bank) welfare.  
While the inflation bias in discretionary regimes may be higher than under commitment, the flexibility with 
which central banks can respond to supply shocks under discretion, may reduce employment fluctuations. 
Thus, there are two opposing effects for the final level of central bank welfare. This can be seen in Table 
1, where equilibrium welfare under commitment is strictly in between the lowest and highest welfare levels 
associated with equilibria in discretionary treatments.    
Hypothesis 9: Under economic transparency, central bank welfare is lower than under commitment or in 
the baseline discretionary treatment. 
For economic transparency the welfare levels in all equilibria are lower than under commitment. The only 
welfare relevant difference between economic transparency and the baseline discretionary treatment is that 
economic transparency does not allow for stabililizing output (in theory). This justifies our last hypothesis.    
   We generally use non-parametric tests based on average observations from a matching group to compare 
levels. We apply this conservative treatment of data, because behavior of different subjects from the same 
matching group need not be independent. For point predictions arising from theory, we use the two-sided 
Wilcoxon matched pairs test, for comparing different treatments, we use the two-sided Mann-Whitney U-
test.  More precise coefficient predictions are tested on the basis of confidence intervals from fixed effects 
regressions, where the unit of observation is matching group, sequence (supergame) number and subject 
ID.  
4.5  Subjects, Sessions and Earnings  
     As noted in section 4.1 each experimental session consisted of 20 inexperienced subjects who were 
further divided up into two “matching groups” of size 10; the subjects in each matching group never 
28 
 
interacted with one another and thus each matching group (2 per session) consistutes an independent 
observation.   
     Sessions were conducted at the Technical University of Berlin and the University of Pittsburgh. 
Specifically, two sesssions of all 6 treatments were conducted in Berlin and two sessions of all 6 treatments 
were conducted in Pittsburgh. Therefore, we have 8 matching groups of 10 subjects (our observational unit) 
for each of our 6 treatments (4 groups from Berlin and 4 groups from Pittsburgh), for a total of 8 × 10 ×
6 = 480 subjects. We did not find subtantial differences in behavior between the two subject populations 
(Berlin and Pittsburgh) and so in the analysis that follows we have pooled the data from all matching groups 
of a given treatment. 
    At the start of each treatment, subjects were read instructions aloud (see the Appendix for the sample 
instructions from the baseline discretionary treatment) and had to answer quiz questions before playing a 
number of supergames that constituted our experiment. Each session lasted 2-3 hours (subjects were always 
invited for 3 hours) and involved one or more open-ended sequences (supergames).  Subjects were paid 
their earnings from 1 or a maximum of 2 supergames (the latter case applied if 2 or more supergames were 
played). They did not know in advance, which supergames were chosen for payoffs. Total payoffs ranged 
from USD $13.30 to $56.46. 
 
5. Experimental Results 
We report our experimental results as a number of different findings which address Hypotheses 1-9 as set 
forth in Section 4.4. 
5.1 Money supply 
Evidence in support of Finding 1 is presented in Figure 1 which shows the mean choice of m over all 
supergames of all sessions of each of our six treatments. Also included is a one-standard error bar and the 
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mean announced value of m in the two treatments involving pre-game communication. The Figure shows 
clearly that the mean choice of m in the commitment treatment is indistinguishable from the Ramsey 
solution m=20, whereas the mean value of m in the other 5 treatments is significantly greater than 20. 
 
Finding 1: Inconsistent with Hypothesis 1a, reputation does not serve as a substitute for commitment in 
any of the five discretionary regimes. 
Two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests show that the money supply under commitment is smaller than in any of 
the other treatments (p<1%), while there are no significant differences between these other treatments 
(p>5%). A two-sided Wilcoxon matched pairs test cannot reject that m=20 under commitment (p=15%), 
but rejects this efficient value for all other treatments (p<1%). The hypothesis that average money supply 
is equal to the point prediction of the one-period Nash equilibrium (m=60) can be rejected for cheap talk 
(p=3.5%) and economic transparency (p=1.6%) treatments, but not for the other three discretionary 
treatments (p>10%). These results suggest that the one-shot Nash equilibrium may be highly relevant in a 
repeated game, even if all of the theoretical conditions necessary for the Ramsey solution being an 
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equilibrium hold. Furthermore, neither cheap talk, nor policy transparency, nor economic transparency are 
effective in reducing the inflation bias, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2a.  
 
Finding 2: Inconsistent with Hypothesis 3, private sector expectations are biased in the five discretionary 
treatments, though not in the commitment treatment. In the discretionary treatments, private sector agents 
systematically under-predict inflation. 
Evidence in support of Finding 2 is presented in Figure 2. Since inflation is equal to the money supply plus 
a transmission shock having an average value of 20, unbiased forecasts should equal m+20. While this 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for the commitment treatment (p=7.8%), we can clearly reject it for all 
discretionary treatments (p<1%), and the direction is always negative, indicating under-prediction of 
inflation.  Comparing the different treatments we find that under commitment, the expectation bias is 
smaller than in all discretionary treatments (p<1%), under cheap talk, the bias is larger than in the other 
discretionary treatments (p<1.1%). PT, PT+CT, and ET produce similar biases (p>40%) and they are all 
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larger than under baseline discretion (p<3%). The existence, direction and size of these expectation biases 
are surprising, and we will discuss some possible explanations below.   
    An immediate consequence of biased expectations, is that average unemployment is smaller than the 
NAIRU. Figure 3 shows the average final Container-1 amount that represents unemployment in our model. 
While the target value is 120, average unemployment in any rational expectations equilibrium (NAIRU) is 
140. Since private sector expectations fall short of average inflation rates, the unemployment rate deviates 
from the natural rate towards the central banks’ target rate (except for commitment). Under cheap talk, the 
effect is so strong that average unemployment is closer to target than to the natural rate.  
 
Besides the different inflation biases across treatments and the different abilities of central banks to stabilize 
employment, the systematic deviations of average unemployment from the natural rate provide a third and 
unexpected factor influencing central bank welfare. For testing Hypothesis 8, we use two different 
measures: we compare the actual payoffs of our central bankers as a measure of central bank welfare, but 
we also compare that payoff with the payoff that the central bank would have achieved in the Ramsey 
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equilibrium had the central banker played an optimal response to shocks. The advantage of the second 
measure is that it eliminates fluctuations in payoffs stemming from shocks. The first measure, however, 
allows for a direct test of the point predictions arising from the various equilibria.  
 
Finding 3: In most discretionary treatments, average welfare is closer to the one-shot Nash equilibrium 
and significantly smaller than under commitment. Only cheap talk works as a substitute for commitment 
regarding welfare.  
Figure 4 shows that average welfare is below the welfare level associated with optimal policy in all 
treatments (p<4%). However, since our subject central bankers are not perfect, they also make mistakes 
under commitment, so that the payoffs of A-players in this treatment are smaller than predicted by 
equilibrium (p<1%). If we compare the achieved payoffs between different treatments, we cannot reject 
Hypothesis 8 for the cheap talk treatment. Here, the achieved payoffs are not smaller than under 
commitment (p=23%), while they are significantly smaller for the other four discretionary treatments 
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(p<1.1%). Comparing the payoffs for cheap talk with the other discretionary treatments directly, the 
evidence is mixed: central bank payoffs are higher under cheap talk than for policy transparency (p=2.1%) 
and economic transparency (p=4.99%), but not significantly different from baseline discretion (p=8.3%) 
and PT+CT (p=13%). Comparing welfare with the predictions of the one-period Nash equilibrium, we can 
clearly reject equality under cheap talk and economic transparency (p=1.6%), but not for the other 
discretionary treatments (p>80%).  
    Regarding Hypothesis 9, we can reject that central bank payoffs under economic transparency equal 
those under commitment (p<1%), but we cannot reject that they equal the payoffs in the baseline 
discretionary treatment (p=96%). For economic transparency, the one-shot Nash equilibrium and the most 
efficient equilibrium are both associated with lower payoffs than the corresponding equilibria under 
baseline discretion. This is because monetary policy cannot stabilize employment in equilibrium if its 
responses to supply shocks are anticipated. However, the forecasts of our B-players respond less to supply 
shocks than necessary to offset the responses by money supply, which results in some stabilization of 
output. In effect the stabilization of output is almost as good as under baseline discretion (see Table 4 
below), so we find similar levels of central bank welfare in both treatments. 
    In order to test hypotheses regarding the players’ responses to each other and to supply shocks, we report 
on treatment-specific, fixed effects regressions where the individual unit (for which fixed effects are 
allowed) is CB (Type A) subject i of matching group j in supergame k. The main regression for central bank 
behavior was   
𝑚𝑡
𝑖  =  𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝑢𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑓𝑡, 
where  𝑚𝑡 
𝑖 is the CB player i’s money supply choice at time t, and 𝑢𝑡 and 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑓𝑡 are, respectively, the supply 
shock and average inflation forecast of the private sector that CB player i faced at time t.  We impose the 
additional restriction that β2=0 for the commitment treatment (where the central bank had to decide on 𝑚 
before knowing the private sector’s forecast). The regression results are displayed in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Central Bank Behavior 
          Treat. 
Parameter  
Commitment Discretion Cheap Talk Policy 
Transparency 
CT + PT Economic 
Transparency 
𝛼 -35.91*** -2.75 -49.29*** -23.69** -30.43*** -32.21*** 
 (5.68) (7.62) (5.79) (9.43) (8.14) (7.20) 
𝛽1 0.43*** 0.35*** 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.40*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
𝛽2 - 0.14** 0.49*** 0.21** 0.30*** 0.46*** 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) 
R2 0.07 0.25 0.57 0.22 0.38 0.38 
The estimated coefficient, 𝛽1, is significantly positive in all treatments (p<1%) indicating that central 
bankers are responding to supply shocks in all six treatments. The significantly positive estimate for 𝛽1 in 
the commitment treatment is at odds with the equilibrium prediction that central bankers should ignore the 
supply shock altogether (provided that forecasters are rational). The estimates for 𝛽1 in the five 
discretionary treatments are not significantly different from the estimated 𝛽1 in the commitment treatment, 
so that we cannot reject Hypothesis 1b, that in the repeated game, the CB responds to supply shocks as if 
s/he were operating under a commitment regime.  In the five discretionary treatments, the estimates for 𝛽1 
are significantly less than the equilibrium predictions (from Table 1) of 2/3 (p<5%).  We also find that 
central bankers respond to average inflation forecasts with 𝛽2 coefficients that are significantly positive, 
but also significantly less than the 2/3 prediction of the one-shot Nash equilibrium (p<5%) in all of the 
discretionary treatments except economic transparency where we cannot reject the null that 𝛽2 = 2/3.  
Hypothesis 2b, that 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 in each of the five discretionary regimes, is rejected for the discretionary, 
policy transparency (PT) and cheap talk plus policy transparency (CT+PT) treatments according to an F-
test (p<5%). In the other two discretionary treatments, cheap talk and economic transparency, CB players 
are attaching approximately equal weight to supply shocks and inflation expectations, consistent with 
Hypothesis 2B. We can also make comparisons across discretionary treatments as to whether the coefficient 
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estimates for either 𝛽1 or 𝛽2 differ pairwise between discretionary treatments. Using a Z-test, we find that 
𝛽1 is significantly greater in the cheap talk, PT and CT+PT treatments as compared with the discretion 
treatment (p<5%). Additionally, 𝛽2 is significantly greater in the cheap talk and ET treatments as compared 
with the discretionary and PT treatments and 𝛽2 is significantly greater in cheap talk treatment as compared 
with the  CT+PT treatment (p<5%).  Thus, it appears that the addition of cheap talk in particular, helps to 
raise the responsiveness of the central bank to supply shocks and average inflation expectations; indeed, 
coefficient estimates for 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are highest in the cheap talk treatment. Summarizing we have: 
Finding 4: Central bank responses to supply shocks are positive in all treatments, contrary to the 
equlibrium prediction for the commitment regime. The estimated weights attached to supply shocks and 
inflation expectations are highest for the cheap talk treatment but are still lower than equilibrium 
predictions for all discretionary treatments and the estimates are often significantly unequal, which is 
inconsistent with Hypotheses 2B.  
We next turn to an analysis of the behavior of type B players (private sector agents). We estimate a 
regression of individual inflation forecasts, 𝑓𝑡
𝑖, using treatment-specific information available to private 
sector agents when forming those forecasts including money supply, 𝑚𝑡, the CB’s announcement, 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡, the 
supply shock, 𝑢𝑡 , lagged own expectations, the lagged own forecast error, and the lagged average forecast. 
While the lagged forecast error can identify eventual learning behavior, the coefficient on the lagged 
average forecast provides a measure of convergence in forecasts. Specifically, we report in Table 3 on a     
   𝑓𝑡
𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛿1 𝑚𝑡  +  𝛿2 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡  +  𝛿3 𝑢𝑡  +   𝛽1 𝑓𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑓𝑡−1, 
where the individual unit (for which fixed effects are allowed) corresponds to type B subject i of matching 
group j in supergame (sequence) k. Results are displayed in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Private Sector Forecasts 
          Treat. 
Parameter 
Commitment  Discretion Cheap Talk 
(1) 
Cheap Talk 
(2)  
Policy 
Transparency 
CT + PT 
(1) 
CT + PT 
(2) 
Economic 
Transparency 
𝛼 18.81*** 13.97*** 36.52*** 29.28*** 29.45*** 46.29*** 43.58*** -20.46*** 
 (0.58) (1.79) (1.97) (4.26) (2.60) (2.90) (4.78) (4.37) 
𝛿1 0.96*** - - - - - - - 
 (0.01)        
𝛿2 - - 0.42*** - - 0.18*** - - 
   (0.02)   (0.02)   
𝛿3 - - - 0.08*** - - 0.05* 0.52*** 
    (0.03)   (0.03) (0.02) 
𝛽1  0.01 0.13*** 0.04 0.04 0.18*** 0.03 0.03 -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
𝛽2 0.05*** 0.29*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
𝛽3  -0.03 0.39*** 0.09** 0.15*** 0.27*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
R2 0.80 0.74 0.38 0.46 0.58 0.41 0.52 0.25 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, numbers in parantheses are estimated 
standard deviations. 
 
In the Commitment treatment, theory predicts that 𝛿1 = 1, and while we can reject this prediction (p<5%), 
the actual estimate (.96) is very close to 1.  Under economic transparency, consistent with Hypothesis 5, 
subjects respond to supply shocks, but the coefficient, 𝛿3, is significantly smaller than the theoretical 
prediction of 2 (p<1%).  Note that for both cheap-talk treatments, the response of inflation forecasts to 
announcements made by the central bank is positive and significant as indicated by the estimate for 𝛿2. If 
cheap talk is combined with policy transparency, the announcement coefficient is reduced by more than 
50%. This shows that our subject central bankers are successful in affecting expectations by non-binding 
announcements, in particular when these announcements cannot be fully evaluated by forecasters against 
actual decisions by the central bankers as in the cheap talk treatment. This finding may come as a surprise 
and it explains why we observe the largest bias between actual and expected inflation in the cheap-talk 
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treatment without policy transparency. We will further analyse CB announcements below, to determine 
whether central bankers try to exploit their effect on expectations.   
    In a second specification for the two cheap talk treatments (2) as reported in Table 3, we also explore 
whether unobserved supply shocks affect individual forecasts via CB announcements. We do this by setting 
𝛿2 = 0 and adding the unobserved (in these treatments) supply shock, 𝑢𝑡. We find that in both cheap talk 
treatments, the supply shock does affect forecasts, as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient 
estimate for 𝛿3  suggesting that the CB is communicating this information via its announcements, contrary 
to Hypothesis 5. By contrast in the economic transparency treatment, private sector forecasts should 
condition on the supply shock with weight 2 (see Table 1) but the estimated weight reported in Table 3 is 
only about one quarter of this prediction. 
Summarizing we have: 
Finding 5: Consistent with theory, under commitment, forecasts are closely aligned with the monetary 
policy choice. Inconsistent with theory, in the cheap talk treatments, forecasts respond to policy 
announcements and, these announcements reveal information about supply shocks. The response of 
inflation forecasts to supply shocks in the economic transparency treatment is about 25% of the predicted 
level. 
Table 3 further reveals that in all treatments, subjects’ forecasts respond to lagged inflation as evidenced 
by the significantly positive coefficient estimates for 𝛽2, which suggests evidence of adaptive learning. 
Numerically, this effect is smallest for commitment and highest for the pure discretionary treatment. 
Further, as 𝛽3 is significantly positive in all discretionary treatments, individual forecasts converge over 
time.9  
                                                          
9 Lagged own and average forecasts are highly correlated, in particular under commitment. We used a 2-step GLS 
estimate as a robustness check, and the qualitative results were the same. 
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    If forecasters are learning, it is puzzling that their expectations are systematically biased towards too low 
an inflation rate, which runs counter to Hypotheses 3 and 4.  Nevertheless, it may be that this bias becomes 
smaller over time. In order to address that question, we analyze the data on expectation bias separately for 
the first and last 15 periods of each treatment10 and focus on the magnitude of the bias in expectations and 
on the welfare effects that are heavily influenced by average unemployment deviating from NAIRU for 
biased expectations. This analysis is presented in Figures 5 (expectation bias) and 6 (welfare). We find that 
the expectation bias is indeed smaller for the later periods than for the first periods in all discretionary 
treatments (see Figure 5), but this difference is significant only for the baseline discretionary treatment and 
for the PT+CT treatment (p<2%; in other treatments: p>10%). In the CT treatment (and only there), the 
average money supply is significantly higher in the later periods than in the early periods (p<1%).11  Rising 
average inflation and unemployment reduce the achieved welfare levels in the CT treatment (see Figure 6): 
the average welfare level in the last 15 periods is at 72.8% of the first best. This is smaller than under 
commitment (p=8.3%) and the differences between CT and the other four discretionary treatments or the 
one-shot Nash equilibrium are not significant anymore (p>19%). For CT, the difference is highly significant 
(p<1%). For all other treatments, the differences are not significant (p>19%). Summarizing, our main result 
from examining expectations and welfare over time is:   
Finding 6: The expectation bias in favor of low inflation diminishes with experience in all discretionary 
treatments. Cheap talk initially raises welfare to levels approximating the first best, but this effect is only 
temporary (first 15 periods). 
                                                          
10 In sessions combining policy transparency with cheap talk, we had only 25 to 32 periods in total due to the extra 
input and feedback required by this treatment.  Thus, for the CT+PT treatment sessions, we took the first and last 12 
periods instead. The other sessions had 30 to 49 periods.  
11 We observe a significant reduction in money supply under commitment (p=5.5%). In other treatments, there are 
no significant differences between money supply in the first and last periods (p>19%).  
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Note: In CT+PT we compared the averages from the first and last 12 periods. 
 
Note: In CT+PT we compared the averages from the first and last 12 periods. 
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 Next, we look at the stability of unemployment across treatments.  Due to the combined responses 
of monetary policy, announcements, and expectations (when it applies) to supply shocks, there may be 
significant differences in the stability of unemployment across treatments. Just looking at the standard 
deviations of unemployment, we find that it is significantly larger than predicted by theory in all treatments. 
In fact, our subject central bankers even contribute to fluctuations in unemployment, because standard 
deviations are usually higher than they would be for a constant money supply. Table 4 displays the standard 
deviation of unemployment, averaged over all matching groups for each treatment along with equilibrium 
predictions, repeated here from Table 1.  
Table 4: Standard Deviation of Unemployment 
 Commitment Discretion Cheap Talk Policy 
Transparency 
CT + PT Economic 
Transparency 
std(𝑦𝑡) 16.56 19.48 17.73 18.66 19.03 20.55 
equilibrium 16.33 12.17 12.17 12.17 12.17 16.33 
 
Two-sided Wilcoxon matched pairs test show that fluctuations in unemployment are significantly larger 
than the equlibrium predictions under the baseline discretion treatment (p=2.3%), economic transparency 
(p<1%), and the combination of cheap talk and policy transparency (p=3.9%). In the other treatments, there 
is no significant difference. The reason for the high variation of unemployment in spite of central bankers 
responding to supply shocks in the right direction are (i) central bankers are changing over time and 
different central bankers are pursuing different policies, (ii) forecasters and their forecasts are changing 
over time and fluctuating expectations contribute to fluctuations in employment, even if central bankers 
respond to expectations in an optimal way,12 and (iii) as we have found, central bankers respond with 
suboptimal coefficients to supply shocks and expectations, so that the combination of both may leave 
unemployment with more fluctuations as under constant expectations and constant money supply. With 
specific regard to Hypothesis 6, we have the following:  
                                                          
12 Note that expectations are constant in equilibrium (except for economic transparency) but fluctuate quite a lot in 
the experiment. An increase in expected inflation has the same effect on the economy as an adverse supply shock. 
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Finding 7: Contrary to Hypothesis 6,  unemployment (output) volatility is not generally lower in the 
commitment and economic transparency treatments as compared with the other discretionary treatments.  
Support for Finding 7 comes from two-sided Mann-Whitney-U tests which indicate that unemployment 
fluctuates less under commitment than under the baseline discretion (p=2.1%) and economic transparency 
(p<1%) treatments. Cheap talk also leads to lower fluctuations than economic transparency (p=2.1%). The 
other pairwise comparisons do not yield significant differences (p>10%). It is remarkable that discretionary 
monetary policy leads to higher fluctuations of employment than commitment (rejecting Hypothesis 6). 
The reason is that in the commitment regime, inflation expectations and the money supply move almost 1 
to 1 (see the coefficient 𝛿1  in Table 3). Hence, the only remaining impact on employment comes from 
exogenous shocks. In the discretionary treatments, changing CB  policies and fluctuations of expectations 
that are not well coordinated with monetary policy lead to higher and unsystematic fluctuations between 
actual and expected inflation and work to destabilize employment. This result was also surprising to us. It 
provides a strong argument in favor of rule-based monetary policy. The fact that cheap talk leads to the 
second lowest standard deviation of employment indicates that announcements could have a small 
stabilizing effect. Of course, this requires that actual policy is correlated with announcements, as is indeed 
the case (as we will show below). However, since the differences in std(y) between cheap talk and most 
other treatments are not significant, we cannot draw any conclusions for the eventual stabilizing effects of 
cheap talk. This topic requries further exploration.13 
Table 5: Standard Deviation of Inflation 
 Commitment Discretion Cheap Talk Policy 
Transparency 
CT + PT Economic 
Transparency 
St.Dev. of 𝜋𝑡 18.86 19.94 19.60 18.44 17.93 20.28 
Equilibrium  11.55 13.88 13.88 13.88 13.88 25.82 
 
                                                          
13 Ahrens et al. (2016) are currently working on a comparable experiment in which they focus on the effects of 
forward guidance. 
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Volatility of inflation is about the same across all treatments (see Table 5). In the treatment CT+PT, it is 
significantly smaller than for the baseline discretionary treatment (p=4.0%) or under economic transparency 
(p=1.4%). PT also leads to smaller inflation volatility than ET (p=5.2%). All other pairwise comparisons 
are insignificant (p>0.17). With the sole exception of the ET treatment, inflation volatility is significantly 
greater than in rational expectations equilibrium (p<1%); under economic transparency, inflation volatility 
is smaller than predicted (p<1%). The high level of inflation volatility can be explained once more by 
central bankers pursuing different policies over time. Under economic transparency, inflation volatility is 
predicted to be higher, because in equilibrium, private sector expectations respond to the shock so strongly 
that the CB has no incentive to deviate. The previous regressions, however, have shown that inflation 
expectations and monetary policy respond to supply shocks with coefficients that are much smaller than in 
equilibrium and the monetary policy response under economic transparency is rather conparable to the other 
discretionary treatments. For this reason, the volatility of inflation under economic transparency is not 
significantly higher than in those other treatments and, thus, lower than predicted by equilibrium theory. In 
the literature, it has been argued that imprecise public announcements may raise the volatility of aggregate 
prices (Amato and Shin, 2003). The evidence in our experiment does not support this view, but the structure 
of our model differs from Amato and Shin in that our forecasters have no incentives to coordinate their 
forecasts.  
  The dispersion of individual forecasts within a group of forecasters provides a good measure for 
the overall transparency of the policy regime. If CB behaviour is fairly predictable, then individual forecasts 
should be close to one another. In equilibrium, all B-players should have the same expectations leading to 
a zero dispersion of individual forecasts independent from the treatment. We find, however, contrary to 
Hypothesis 4, that there are significant differences in this dispersion across treatments (see Table 6). 
Table 6: Average Dispersion of Forecasts Within Groups and Forecasters’ payoffs 
 Commitment Discretion Cheap Talk Policy 
Transparency 
CT + PT Economic 
Transparency 
St.dev. (𝜋𝑡
𝑖|𝑡) 5.56 8.94 11.57 9.16 11.09 12.28 
Avg. Payoff 
of B-players 
3799 3537 3426 3515 3475 3451 
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In the commitment treatment, the dispersion of individual forecasts is smaller than in all discretionary 
treatments (p<1%). Within discretionary treatments, the dispersion is higher when forecasters get more 
information, as under cheap talk, CT+PT, or economic transparency. The differences between dispersion 
in these treatments vis-á-vis the baseline discretionary or policy transparency treatment are all significant 
(p<10%), while differences within this group or between baseline and policy transparency are not 
significant (p>10%). Without these signals, private sector agents can more easily coordinate on a common 
expectation. These findings contrast with empirical results by Ehrmann et al. (2012), who “find that central 
bank transparency and communication (…) reduce the dispersion of professional forecasters’ views” 
(p.1019). Hubert (2015), however, attributes the impact of central bank communication on professional 
forecasts to their policy dimension rather than their economic accuracy.  
Since our B-players are paid according to forecast accuracy, their payoffs measure the quality of 
their forecasts. Under commitment, these payoffs are greater than in all discretionary treatments (p<1%). 
We find no significant differences in B-players’ payoffs between discretionary treatments (p>10%), except 
that payoffs under economic transparency are somewhat smaller relative to baseline discretion (p=7%). 
Summarizing, we have:  
Finding 8:  Inconsistent with Hypothesis 4, distribution of individual forecasts around the average 
inflation forecast differs across treatments. 
Why don’t B-type subjects use cheap-talk announcements or information about supply shocks to better 
coordinate their expectations than in the baseline treatment without this information? The data indicate that 
subjects disagree in how actual money supply is related to announcements or supply shocks. Different 
perceptions of CB credibility create a huge dispersion in forecasts. Further, under economic transparency, 
subjects can have different expectations about the CB’s responses to supply shocks. If these expectations 
diverge, the posterior beliefs after learning the supply shock may be more dispersed than prior beliefs 
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without such information. While in theory, economic transparency raises forecasters’ payoffs compared to 
baseline discretion, we observe just the opposite in our experimental data.  
As cheap talk seems to have a remarkable impact on the economies, we also analyse how the cheap-
talk messages depend on various explanatory variables. Here, we use three different specifications which 
are versions of the regression model:   
 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡
𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛿1 𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝛽2(𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑓𝑡−1
 − 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡−1
𝑖 ) + 𝛽3𝑚𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝛽4𝜋𝑡−1,  
where the variable names are as described earlier.  Table 7 reports on fixed effects regression results where 
the individual unit is as described previously for Table 2.  
Table 7: Cheap Talk Announcements 
          Treat. 
Parameter  
Cheap Talk 
(1) 
Cheap Talk 
(2) 
Cheap Talk 
(3) 
CT + PT 
(1) 
CT + PT 
(2) 
CT + PT 
(3) 
𝛼 -26.43*** -28.72*** -23.54*** 2.45 18.75 12.46 
 (8.38) (8.79) (8.57) (10.64) (12.16) (12.01) 
𝛿1 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.19*** 0.17** 0.20*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
𝛽1 0.02 - - 0.04 - - 
 (0.06)   (0.04)   
𝛽2 - 0.05 0.04 - -0.20*** -0.20*** 
  (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06) 
𝛽3 0.05 0.06 - -0.19 -0.26*** - 
 (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.07)  
𝛽4 - - -0.02 - - -0.15*** 
   (0.04)   (0.05) 
R2 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.11 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, numbers in parantheses are estimated standard deviations. 
 
 
Note first, and most importantly, that for both cheap talk treatments, and all regression specifications, the 
CB’s announcements vary positively and significantly with the supply shocks as evidenced by the 
significantly positive estimates for 𝛿1. Thus, these CB announcements are informative about the current 
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state of fundamentals, and private sector forecasters can extract some information from them. However, 
given the low R2 and the low coefficient estimates by which CB-players respond to these supply shocks, 
the forecasters should put a very low weight on these announcements, which is indeed in line with the low 
weights given to CB announcements as reported in the regressions reported in Table 3. Notice second that 
there is no persistence in announcements, as evidenced by the insignificant coefficient attached to 𝛽1. 
Finally, the significantly negative coefficient estimates for 𝛽2 in the CT+PT treatment suggest that the 
greater the departure of lagged inflation forecasts from the lagged announcements, the more the CB 
attempts to dampen down inflationary pressure by announcing an even lower policy choice for 𝑚𝑡 . 
Eventually, it seems,  the private sector learns to ignore these cheap talk messages because of the evident 
disconnect between the CB announcements and actual inflation as revealed in Figure 1, but this does not 
prevent the CB from trying to use cheap talk announcements to influence private sector expectations. 
Summarizing, we have:   
Finding 9: Cheap talk announcements by CB players are informative as they convey information about 
supply shocks. When there is also policy transparency, CB players react to departures of inflation 
forecasts from lagged announcements by lowering their announced policy for 𝑚𝑡.    
6. Conclusion 
Central bankers operate in a discretionary world, where they face a trade-off between credibility in 
stabilizing inflationary expectations on the one hand and flexibility in response to economic shocks on the 
other.  In this paper we have posed the question of whether a balance can be found between these twin 
objectives in a repeated game setting, where reputational concerns might serve as a substitute for 
commitment so that welfare under discretionary policy might approximate or even exceed the levels 
attainable under a full commitment regime. We addressed this question using a version of the Barro-
Gordon (1983ab) monetary policy game model and controlled laboratory experiments with paid human 
subjects serving in the role of private sector agents forecasting inflation or as central bankers facing the 
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policy trade-off between credibility and flexibility. The advantage of our laboratory approach is that we 
have good control over the incentive structure and information available to all actors so that we can 
formulate crisp equilibrium predictions about the type of behavior we should observe under commitment 
and discretionary regimes. This same level of control is not available using field data so that an evaluation 
of whether central banks are behaving in a discretionary repeated game setting as if they had a 
commitment is not really testable in the field.   
In answer to the question we posed, we can unambiguously reject the notion that reputation in the 
discretionary repeated game setting leads to outcomes approximating the first best, Ramsey solution in 
favor of the alternative that behavior is closer to the predictions of the one-shot Nash equilibrium, involving 
higher inflation and lower welfare. Importantly, as we also study the full commitment regime in the 
laboratory, we are able to show that there are important policy and welfare differences between the 
commitment and discretionary regimes.  In addition, we have considered several augmented versions of our 
baseline discretionary policy regime that allow central bank cheap talk about policy intentions, ex-post 
transparency about policy actions, both cheap talk and policy transparency and economic transparency.  
Among these mechanisms, only cheap talk served to raise welfare to levels approximating those achieved 
under the commitment regime, as central bankers tried to convince private sector agents that they would 
keep inflation low. However even this effect diminished over time, as private sector agents learned to ignore 
the CB’s cheap talk messages. We conclude that the discretionary regimes of our laboratory study are 
indeed welfare reducing relative to the commitment regime, and that flexibility in responding to economic 
shocks and expectations appears to dominate any longer-term concerns about credible maintenance of low 
inflationary expectations. This welfare conclusion is further supported by the observation that private sector 
forecasters earn the highest payoffs under a commitment regime. 
It is remarkable that we do not find a trade-off between credibility and flexibility. Indeed, we find 
that discretionary policy regimes which allow for the stabilization of employment actually lead to higher 
variations in employment than under a perfectly credible commitment regime where stabilization is not 
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possible, although central bankers do make an attempt to stabilize the impact of supply shocks in all 
regimes. As we have seen, there are several reasons for this divergence between theory and outcomes.  First, 
central-bank responses to shocks are smaller than optimal in all of our discretionary treatments, diminishing 
the stabilizing role of those more flexible discretionary regimes.  Second, changes in strategies by different 
central bankers provide an additional source of strategic uncertainty that is not addressed by the theory. As 
this strategic uncertainty is likely to carry over to the field, we conclude that central banks would do well 
to follow strict rules and make them common knowledge among forecasters. Any changes in central bank 
strategies should be communicated thoroughly and before they are implemented, to minimize strategic 
uncertainty. Third, forecasters are unable to effectively use the additional information provided by central 
bank announcements or about shocks (under economic transparency) to improve their forecasts. The reason 
is that forecasters disagree about the quality of announcements and the likely response of central bankers 
to supply shocks. Unlike all theoretical predictions, this strategic uncertainty raises forecast errors relative 
to the baseline discretionary regime in which forecasters do not get any additional information regarding 
the realization of the current period’s random variables. From the latter result we conclude that CBs should 
avoid providing ambiguous signals or information about fundamentals that leave the private sector puzzled 
about the likely response of inflation to those fundamentals. 
We expect that our experimental findings carry over to the “real world” as well since the incentives 
and uncertainties that our subjects faced also approximate those faced by real central bankers and private 
sector agents.  For instance, we note that there is corroborating empirical evidence that central banks publish 
inflation forecasts to strategically manipulate private inflation forecasts just as our subjects central bankers 
do in the treatments with cheap talk (Gomez-Barrero and Parra-Polania, 2014). While it is possible that 
well-intentioned, real world central bankers, aware of the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy, 
can learn to implement the optimal policy – in the words of McCallum (1995), they “just need to do it” – 
the long debate about rules versus discretion in central bank policy suggests that there are also doubts about 
the ability of such real world central bankers to effectively manage the trade-off between credibility and 
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flexibility. The experimental evidence that we have presented in this paper provides further evidence that 
such doubts may be warranted.    
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Appendix: Instructions Used in the Baseline Discretionary Treatment (Other Instructions are Similar) 
1. Overview 
Welcome to this experiment in the economics of decision-making.  Please read these instructions 
carefully as they explain how you earn money from the decisions you make in today’s experiment. There 
is no talking for the duration of today’s session.  
We will first go over these instructions. When we are done, each of you will have to answer a few brief 
questions to ensure that all participants understand these instructions. You will also have time to ask 
clarifying questions. Then, you will begin making your decisions using the computer workstations. 
 
Today’s session consists of a number of “sequences”. Each sequence consists of a number of “rounds”.  
At the start of each sequence the computer program will randomly assign all participants to a  5-member 
group. All random groupings of 5 participants are equally likely.  Once you are assigned to a 5-member 
group, you will play all rounds of the sequence with the same 4 other members of your group.  At the start 
of each new sequence, the computer program will again randomly assign players to 5-member groups. 
Your interactions with other participants is always anonymous; you will not be informed of the identity of 
any group member in any sequence played, nor will they be informed of your identity, even after today’s 
session is over. 
Prior to the first round of each new sequence, the program randomly selects one member of your 5-
member group and assigns that person the role of Player A. The other 4 members of your group are 
assigned the role of Player B. You and the other 4 participants will remain in your role of Player A or B 
for all rounds of the sequence.  At the start of each new sequence, the computer program will once again 
assign roles randomly among the members of your new 5-member group, and you will remain in your 
new role for the duration of that new sequence. 
2. The decisions to be made 
Imagine there are two containers labeled Container 1 and Container 2.  At the start of each round, 
Container 1 holds W0 gallons of water while Container 2 is empty.  
In each round, the four Player Bs in each group move first. Each Player B submits his forecast as to how 
many gallons of water there will be in Container 2 at the end of the round.  
After all Player Bs have made their forecasts, the computer program calculates the average of the four 
Player B forecasts, which we denote by af.  This average forecast is added to the amount of water in 
Container 1 so that the total amount of water in Container 1 is now W0+ af.   
Next, Player A learns both W0 and af  and thereby the total amount of water in Container 1. Then, Player 
A can move up to 80 gallons of water from Container 1 to Container 2. Denote the amount moved by M. 
In addition, there is an uncontrolled flow of water V from Container 1 to Container 2. Thus, the final 
amount of water in Container 2 is M + V. 
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2.1.    Specific details  
The initial water level in Container 1, W0, is a random variable.  For each round of a sequence, the 
computer program draws the value of W0 randomly from a uniform distribution over the interval [120, 
160], which means that the minimum possible value of W0 is 120 and the maximum possible value of W0 
is 160. All numbers between 120 and 160 inclusive have an equal chance of being drawn, so the expected 
value of W0 is 140. 
In each round, the four Player B’s in each group move first.  Each must submit a forecast, f, of the 
amount of water that will be in Container 2 at the end of the round. Recall that Container 2 is initially 
empty.  Forecasts may range from 0 to 120 units of water inclusive in Container 2.  Player Bs should type 
their forecast in the input box on the first decision screen when prompted.  Click the OK button when 
satisfied with your choice.      
After all four Player Bs have entered their forecasts, the computer program calculates the average value 
of the four forecasts. We denote this average forecast by af.  Then, af  units of water are added to 
Container 1. So, the average forecast increases the amount of water in Container 1.  
The total amount of water in Container 1 is now W0 + af. 
Note that Player Bs do not know precisely the value of W0 nor do they know af; they do know that W0  is 
a uniform draw from [120, 160] and their own forecast, f. 
Next, Player A alone is informed of the value of af for the round. In addition, Player A learns this round’s 
value of W0 and is told the amount of water in Container 1, W0+af. 
After observing the values of af and W0  and the total amount of water in Container 1, the Player A in 
each group must decide how much water to move from Container 1 to the empty Container 2.  Player A 
can move  up to 80 gallons of water inclusive from Container 1 to Container 2 in each round.  Let us 
denote by M the amount of water moved by Player A from Container 1 to Container 2.  Player A should 
type his or her choice for M in the input box on the first decision screen when prompted. Click the OK 
button when satisfied with your choice.    
In addition, there is an uncontrolled flow of water from Container 1 to Container 2. This flow is another 
random variable, denoted by V.  The computer program draws the value of V randomly from a uniform 
distribution over the interval [0, 40], which means that the minimum possible value of V is 0 and the 
maximum possible value of V is 40. All numbers between 0 and 40 inclusive have an equal chance of 
being drawn, so the expected value of V is 20. Player A does not know V when deciding how much water 
to move, M. The uncontrolled flow, V, is determined only after Player A’s choice of M has been made. 
The final amount of water in Container 1 is: W0 + af – M – V.  
The final amount of water in Container 2 is M + V. 
Participants’ payoffs depend on the final amounts of water in Containers 1 and 2 as described in the next 
section. 
2.2. Payoffs for the round 
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If you are a Player A, the final amounts of water in both Containers 1 and 2 are used to determine your 
payoff in points for the round according to the formula: 
Player A Points =  4000 – 2 (Final Container 1 amount – 120)2 – (Final Container 2 amount – 40)2 
For your convenience, a non-exhaustive table of values for Player A’s payoff in points is given in Table A 
as a function of the final water levels in Containers 1 and 2.  Notice that Player A’s maximize their payoff  
if the final amount of water in Containers 1 and 2 are as close as possible to 120 and 40, respectively, and 
that deviations in the final Container 1 water amount from 120 are 2 times more costly than are deviations 
of the final Container 2 water amount from 40. 
If you are a Player B, only the final amount of water in Container 2 matters for your payoff in points. 
Specifically, your payoff in points for the round is given by the formula:  
Player B Points = 4000 – (Final Container 2 amount – f )2 
Note that f denotes a Player B’s own forecast for the round (and not the average forecast, af). For your 
convenience, a non-exhaustive table of values for Player B’s payoff in points is given in Table B 
(attached) as a function of the forecast error, Final Container 2 amount – f . Notice that Player B’s 
maximize their payoffs when the forecast error is 0, that is when f=Final Container 2 amount. 
   Feedback and record keeping at the end of each round. 
At the end of each round, Player As will be reminded of W0, af and their choice of M. They will then be 
told the value of the random variable V, and the final amounts of water in Containers 1 and 2. Finally, 
Player A’s will be told their payoff in points for the round and their cumulative point total for the 
sequence.  
At the end of each round, Player Bs will be reminded of their choice of f. They will then be told the final 
amounts of water in Containers 1 and 2 and the value of the random variable W0. Finally, they will be told 
their payoff in points for the round and their cumulative point total for the sequence.   
Following revelation of this information, the round is over. Please record the results of the round on your 
record sheets under the appropriate headings. When you are done recording this information press the 
continue button.  The sequence may or may not continue with a new round.  If a new round is played, the 
procedure will be the same as described above. Following the first round of a sequence, all players will 
see at the bottom of their screens, a history of past final amounts of water in Containers 1 and 2 for the 
five-person group they were in along with their own payoff in points for each round and their cumulative 
payoff in points from all rounds played in a given sequence.  
3. When does a sequence of rounds continue and when does it end? 
At the end of each round, the computer program will randomly draw a number (an integer) between 1 and 
6, inclusive. All numbers, 1,2,3,4, 5 and 6 have an equal chance of being drawn; it is like rolling a six-sided 
die. The number drawn will be displayed on your computer screen. If the number chosen is 1,2,3,4 or 5, the 
sequence will continue with a new round.  If a 6 is chosen, the sequence will end.  Thus, there is a 5 in 6 
(83.33 percent) chance that a sequence will continue from one round to the next and a 1 in 6 (16.67 percent) 
chance that the current round will be the last round of the sequence.  
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Depending on the time available, a new sequence may then begin.  At the start of this new sequence you 
would be randomly formed into new 5-member groups. One member of each group would be randomly 
chosen to play the role of Player A. The other four members would be assigned the role of Player B. These 
roles would again remain fixed for the duration of the new sequence. 
If, by chance, the final sequence has not ended by the three-hour time period for which you have been 
recruited, we will schedule a continuation of that final sequence for another time in which everyone here 
can attend. You would be paid based on your cumulative point total for one randomly selected sequence 
that finished in today’s session and if you had to return for a continuation of a sequence, you would also be 
paid based on your cumulative point total for that final sequence, once it had finally ended. 
4. Earnings   
If today’s session ends within the 3-hour time period for which you have been recruited, then your payoff 
will depend on the total number of points you earned in a maximum of two of the sequences that were 
played in today’s session.  Specifically, if only one sequence was played, then your point total for the 
session will equal your point total from that sequence.  If two or more sequences have been played, then 
your point total for the session will be the sum of your cumulative point totals from two sequences. One 
of these two sequences will be the one in which you earned the highest cumulative point total from among 
all sequences played in today’s session.  The other sequence will be one that is randomly chosen from 
among all sequences played in today’s session. Your session point total from the chosen sequence(s) will 
be converted into dollars at the rate of 2000 points =$1.00 (or 20 points = 1 cent). Clearly, the more points 
you earn the higher is your dollar payoff.  Since you don’t know in advance which sequence(s) will 
determine your payoff, you will want to do your best in every sequence.  If as mentioned above, the final 
sequence does not end within the 3 hour time period, then you would be paid for one randomly chosen 
sequence that ended in today’s session (provided that event occurred) and/or for the final sequence, when 
that final sequence finally ended, in a later continuation session. 
In addition to your dollar earnings from the two sequences chosen for payment, you begin each sequence 
with 5000 points ($2.50). The 5,000 initial endowment of points will show up in your cumulative point 
total for each sequence. Since we will pick two sequences for payment, these two initial point balances of 
5,000 points (10,000 total) comprise your $5.00 payment for participation in this session.  If only one 
sequence is played in today’s session then we will add another 5000 points to your cumulative point total 
for that one sequence. Note that your initial or cumulative point total in each sequence is reduced by 
negative points earned in any round. 
5. Questions   
 
Now is the time for questions.  If you have a question about any aspect of these instructions, please raise 
your hand and an experimenter will come to you and answer your question in private. 
 
6. Quiz  
Before the start of the experiment we ask you to answer the following quiz questions in the spaces 
provided. The numbers in these quiz questions are merely illustrative; the actual numbers in the session 
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may be quite different. Feel free to consult the instructions and tables to answer these questions. After all 
participants have completed this quiz we will come around to check your answers. 
1. Suppose Player A observes that W0 =130 and af=60 so that the new level of water in Container 1 
is: 190.  Player A then chooses M= 70. Suppose it turns out that V =25. What is the final amount 
of water in Container 2 in this case? _______   What is the final amount of water in Container 
1?__________ What is Player A’s payoff in points for the round? _________ If a Player B 
forecast f=75, what would be that individual Player B’s payoff for the round? ________ 
 
2. Same situation as in question 1, except that Player A chooses M=40 instead of M=70.  What is 
the final amount of water in Container 2 in this case? _______   What is the final amount of water 
in Container 1?__________ What is Player A’s payoff in points for the round? _________ If a 
Player B forecast f=75, what would be that individual Player B’s payoff for the round? ________ 
 
3. Suppose Player A observes that W0.=150 and af=30 so the new level of water in Container 1 
is:180. Player A then chooses M=30. Suppose it turns out that V =15. What is the final amount of 
water in Container 2 in this case? _______   What is the final amount of water in Container 
1?__________ What is Player A’s payoff in points for the round? _________ If a Player B 
forecast f=35, what would be that individual Player B’s payoff for the round? ________ 
 
4. Same situation as in question 3, except that Player A chooses M=10 instead of M=40.  What is 
the final amount of water in Container 2 in this case? _______   What is the final amount of water 
in Container 1?__________ What is Player A’s payoff in points for the round? _________ If a 
Player B forecast f=35, what would be that individual Player B’s payoff for the round? ________ 
 
5. Suppose it is round 2 of a sequence.  What is the chance that the sequence will continue with 
round 3? _________.  Would your answer change if we replaced round 2 with round 12 and 
round 3 with round 13?    Circle one:  yes    /    no. 
 
6. True or false?  You will remain in the same role as a Player A or Player B in all rounds of all 
sequences?   Circle one:   True   /   False. 
 
7. True or false?  You will be paid based on the points you earned in a maximum of two sequences. 
Circle one:  True   /   False. 
Table A: Player A's Payoff in Points=4000‐(Final Container 1 amount‐120)2‐(Final Container 2 amount ‐40)2
Final Amount in Container 2 →
Final Amount in 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120
Container 1 ↓ 0 ‐12000 ‐11625 ‐11300 ‐11025 ‐10800 ‐10625 ‐10500 ‐10425 ‐10400 ‐10425 ‐10500 ‐10625 ‐10800 ‐11025 ‐11300 ‐11625 ‐12000 ‐12425 ‐12900 ‐13425 ‐14000 ‐14625 ‐15300 ‐16025 ‐16800
10 ‐9700 ‐9325 ‐9000 ‐8725 ‐8500 ‐8325 ‐8200 ‐8125 ‐8100 ‐8125 ‐8200 ‐8325 ‐8500 ‐8725 ‐9000 ‐9325 ‐9700 ‐10125 ‐10600 ‐11125 ‐11700 ‐12325 ‐13000 ‐13725 ‐14500
20 ‐7600 ‐7225 ‐6900 ‐6625 ‐6400 ‐6225 ‐6100 ‐6025 ‐6000 ‐6025 ‐6100 ‐6225 ‐6400 ‐6625 ‐6900 ‐7225 ‐7600 ‐8025 ‐8500 ‐9025 ‐9600 ‐10225 ‐10900 ‐11625 ‐12400
30 ‐5700 ‐5325 ‐5000 ‐4725 ‐4500 ‐4325 ‐4200 ‐4125 ‐4100 ‐4125 ‐4200 ‐4325 ‐4500 ‐4725 ‐5000 ‐5325 ‐5700 ‐6125 ‐6600 ‐7125 ‐7700 ‐8325 ‐9000 ‐9725 ‐10500
40 ‐4000 ‐3625 ‐3300 ‐3025 ‐2800 ‐2625 ‐2500 ‐2425 ‐2400 ‐2425 ‐2500 ‐2625 ‐2800 ‐3025 ‐3300 ‐3625 ‐4000 ‐4425 ‐4900 ‐5425 ‐6000 ‐6625 ‐7300 ‐8025 ‐8800
50 ‐2500 ‐2125 ‐1800 ‐1525 ‐1300 ‐1125 ‐1000 ‐925 ‐900 ‐925 ‐1000 ‐1125 ‐1300 ‐1525 ‐1800 ‐2125 ‐2500 ‐2925 ‐3400 ‐3925 ‐4500 ‐5125 ‐5800 ‐6525 ‐7300
60 ‐1200 ‐825 ‐500 ‐225 0 175 300 375 400 375 300 175 0 ‐225 ‐500 ‐825 ‐1200 ‐1625 ‐2100 ‐2625 ‐3200 ‐3825 ‐4500 ‐5225 ‐6000
65 ‐625 ‐250 75 350 575 750 875 950 975 950 875 750 575 350 75 ‐250 ‐625 ‐1050 ‐1525 ‐2050 ‐2625 ‐3250 ‐3925 ‐4650 ‐5425
70 ‐100 275 600 875 1100 1275 1400 1475 1500 1475 1400 1275 1100 875 600 275 ‐100 ‐525 ‐1000 ‐1525 ‐2100 ‐2725 ‐3400 ‐4125 ‐4900
75 375 750 1075 1350 1575 1750 1875 1950 1975 1950 1875 1750 1575 1350 1075 750 375 ‐50 ‐525 ‐1050 ‐1625 ‐2250 ‐2925 ‐3650 ‐4425
80 800 1175 1500 1775 2000 2175 2300 2375 2400 2375 2300 2175 2000 1775 1500 1175 800 375 ‐100 ‐625 ‐1200 ‐1825 ‐2500 ‐3225 ‐4000
85 1175 1550 1875 2150 2375 2550 2675 2750 2775 2750 2675 2550 2375 2150 1875 1550 1175 750 275 ‐250 ‐825 ‐1450 ‐2125 ‐2850 ‐3625
90 1500 1875 2200 2475 2700 2875 3000 3075 3100 3075 3000 2875 2700 2475 2200 1875 1500 1075 600 75 ‐500 ‐1125 ‐1800 ‐2525 ‐3300
95 1775 2150 2475 2750 2975 3150 3275 3350 3375 3350 3275 3150 2975 2750 2475 2150 1775 1350 875 350 ‐225 ‐850 ‐1525 ‐2250 ‐3025
100 2000 2375 2700 2975 3200 3375 3500 3575 3600 3575 3500 3375 3200 2975 2700 2375 2000 1575 1100 575 0 ‐625 ‐1300 ‐2025 ‐2800
105 2175 2550 2875 3150 3375 3550 3675 3750 3775 3750 3675 3550 3375 3150 2875 2550 2175 1750 1275 750 175 450 1125 1850 2625‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
110 2300 2675 3000 3275 3500 3675 3800 3875 3900 3875 3800 3675 3500 3275 3000 2675 2300 1875 1400 875 300 ‐325 ‐1000 ‐1725 ‐2500
115 2375 2750 3075 3350 3575 3750 3875 3950 3975 3950 3875 3750 3575 3350 3075 2750 2375 1950 1475 950 375 ‐250 ‐925 ‐1650 ‐2425
120 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500 975 400 ‐225 ‐900 ‐1625 ‐2400
125 2375 2750 3075 3350 3575 3750 3875 3950 3975 3950 3875 3750 3575 3350 3075 2750 2375 1950 1475 950 375 ‐250 ‐925 ‐1650 ‐2425
130 2300 2675 3000 3275 3500 3675 3800 3875 3900 3875 3800 3675 3500 3275 3000 2675 2300 1875 1400 875 300 ‐325 ‐1000 ‐1725 ‐2500
135 2175 2550 2875 3150 3375 3550 3675 3750 3775 3750 3675 3550 3375 3150 2875 2550 2175 1750 1275 750 175 ‐450 ‐1125 ‐1850 ‐2625
140 2000 2375 2700 2975 3200 3375 3500 3575 3600 3575 3500 3375 3200 2975 2700 2375 2000 1575 1100 575 0 ‐625 ‐1300 ‐2025 ‐2800
145 1775 2150 2475 2750 2975 3150 3275 3350 3375 3350 3275 3150 2975 2750 2475 2150 1775 1350 875 350 ‐225 ‐850 ‐1525 ‐2250 ‐3025
150 1500 1875 2200 2475 2700 2875 3000 3075 3100 3075 3000 2875 2700 2475 2200 1875 1500 1075 600 75 ‐500 ‐1125 ‐1800 ‐2525 ‐3300
155 1175 1550 1875 2150 2375 2550 2675 2750 2775 2750 2675 2550 2375 2150 1875 1550 1175 750 275 ‐250 ‐825 ‐1450 ‐2125 ‐2850 ‐3625
160 800 1175 1500 1775 2000 2175 2300 2375 2400 2375 2300 2175 2000 1775 1500 1175 800 375 ‐100 ‐625 ‐1200 ‐1825 ‐2500 ‐3225 ‐4000
170 ‐100 275 600 875 1100 1275 1400 1475 1500 1475 1400 1275 1100 875 600 275 ‐100 ‐525 ‐1000 ‐1525 ‐2100 ‐2725 ‐3400 ‐4125 ‐4900
180 ‐1200 ‐825 ‐500 ‐225 0 175 300 375 400 375 300 175 0 ‐225 ‐500 ‐825 ‐1200 ‐1625 ‐2100 ‐2625 ‐3200 ‐3825 ‐4500 ‐5225 ‐6000
190 ‐2500 ‐2125 ‐1800 ‐1525 ‐1300 ‐1125 ‐1000 ‐925 ‐900 ‐925 ‐1000 ‐1125 ‐1300 ‐1525 ‐1800 ‐2125 ‐2500 ‐2925 ‐3400 ‐3925 ‐4500 ‐5125 ‐5800 ‐6525 ‐7300
200 ‐4000 ‐3625 ‐3300 ‐3025 ‐2800 ‐2625 ‐2500 ‐2425 ‐2400 ‐2425 ‐2500 ‐2625 ‐2800 ‐3025 ‐3300 ‐3625 ‐4000 ‐4425 ‐4900 ‐5425 ‐6000 ‐6625 ‐7300 ‐8025 ‐8800
210 ‐5700 ‐5325 ‐5000 ‐4725 ‐4500 ‐4325 ‐4200 ‐4125 ‐4100 ‐4125 ‐4200 ‐4325 ‐4500 ‐4725 ‐5000 ‐5325 ‐5700 ‐6125 ‐6600 ‐7125 ‐7700 ‐8325 ‐9000 ‐9725 ‐10500
220 ‐7600 ‐7225 ‐6900 ‐6625 ‐6400 ‐6225 ‐6100 ‐6025 ‐6000 ‐6025 ‐6100 ‐6225 ‐6400 ‐6625 ‐6900 ‐7225 ‐7600 ‐8025 ‐8500 ‐9025 ‐9600 ‐10225 ‐10900 ‐11625 ‐12400
230 ‐9700 ‐9325 ‐9000 ‐8725 ‐8500 ‐8325 ‐8200 ‐8125 ‐8100 ‐8125 ‐8200 ‐8325 ‐8500 ‐8725 ‐9000 ‐9325 ‐9700 ‐10125 ‐10600 ‐11125 ‐11700 ‐12325 ‐13000 ‐13725 ‐14500
240 ‐12000 ‐11625 ‐11300 ‐11025 ‐10800 ‐10625 ‐10500 ‐10425 ‐10400 ‐10425 ‐10500 ‐10625 ‐10800 ‐11025 ‐11300 ‐11625 ‐12000 ‐12425 ‐12900 ‐13425 ‐14000 ‐14625 ‐15300 ‐16025 ‐16800
250 ‐14500 ‐14125 ‐13800 ‐13525 ‐13300 ‐13125 ‐13000 ‐12925 ‐12900 ‐12925 ‐13000 ‐13125 ‐13300 ‐13525 ‐13800 ‐14125 ‐14500 ‐14925 ‐15400 ‐15925 ‐16500 ‐17125 ‐17800 ‐18525 ‐19300
260 ‐17200 ‐16825 ‐16500 ‐16225 ‐16000 ‐15825 ‐15700 ‐15625 ‐15600 ‐15625 ‐15700 ‐15825 ‐16000 ‐16225 ‐16500 ‐16825 ‐17200 ‐17625 ‐18100 ‐18625 ‐19200 ‐19825 ‐20500 ‐21225 ‐22000
270 ‐20100 ‐19725 ‐19400 ‐19125 ‐18900 ‐18725 ‐18600 ‐18525 ‐18500 ‐18525 ‐18600 ‐18725 ‐18900 ‐19125 ‐19400 ‐19725 ‐20100 ‐20525 ‐21000 ‐21525 ‐22100 ‐22725 ‐23400 ‐24125 ‐24900
280 ‐23200 ‐22825 ‐22500 ‐22225 ‐22000 ‐21825 ‐21700 ‐21625 ‐21600 ‐21625 ‐21700 ‐21825 ‐22000 ‐22225 ‐22500 ‐22825 ‐23200 ‐23625 ‐24100 ‐24625 ‐25200 ‐25825 ‐26500 ‐27225 ‐28000
Table B: Player B's Payoff in Points=4000‐(Final Container 2 amount ‐f )2
Forecast, f  of Amount in Container 2 →
Container 2 Amt. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120
↓ 0 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500 975 400 ‐225 ‐900 ‐1625 ‐2400 ‐3225 ‐4100 ‐5025 ‐6000 ‐7025 ‐8100 ‐9225 ‐10400
5 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500 975 400 ‐225 ‐900 ‐1625 ‐2400 ‐3225 ‐4100 ‐5025 ‐6000 ‐7025 ‐8100 ‐9225
10 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500 975 400 ‐225 ‐900 ‐1625 ‐2400 ‐3225 ‐4100 ‐5025 ‐6000 ‐7025 ‐8100
15 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500 975 400 ‐225 ‐900 ‐1625 ‐2400 ‐3225 ‐4100 ‐5025 ‐6000 ‐7025
20 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500 975 400 ‐225 ‐900 ‐1625 ‐2400 ‐3225 ‐4100 ‐5025 ‐6000
25 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500 975 400 ‐225 ‐900 ‐1625 ‐2400 ‐3225 ‐4100 ‐5025
30 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500 975 400 ‐225 ‐900 ‐1625 ‐2400 ‐3225 ‐4100
35 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500 975 400 ‐225 ‐900 ‐1625 ‐2400 ‐3225
40 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500 975 400 ‐225 ‐900 ‐1625 ‐2400
45 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500 975 400 ‐225 ‐900 ‐1625
50 1500 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500 975 400 ‐225 ‐900
55 975 1500 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500 975 400 ‐225
60 400 975 1500 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500 975 400
65 ‐225 400 975 1500 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500 975
70 ‐900 ‐225 400 975 1500 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975 1500
75 1625 900 225 400 975 1500 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400 1975‐ ‐ ‐
80 ‐2400 ‐1625 ‐900 ‐225 400 975 1500 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775 2400
85 ‐3225 ‐2400 ‐1625 ‐900 ‐225 400 975 1500 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100 2775
90 ‐4100 ‐3225 ‐2400 ‐1625 ‐900 ‐225 400 975 1500 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375 3100
95 ‐5025 ‐4100 ‐3225 ‐2400 ‐1625 ‐900 ‐225 400 975 1500 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600 3375
100 ‐6000 ‐5025 ‐4100 ‐3225 ‐2400 ‐1625 ‐900 ‐225 400 975 1500 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775 3600
105 ‐7025 ‐6000 ‐5025 ‐4100 ‐3225 ‐2400 ‐1625 ‐900 ‐225 400 975 1500 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900 3775
110 ‐8100 ‐7025 ‐6000 ‐5025 ‐4100 ‐3225 ‐2400 ‐1625 ‐900 ‐225 400 975 1500 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975 3900
115 ‐9225 ‐8100 ‐7025 ‐6000 ‐5025 ‐4100 ‐3225 ‐2400 ‐1625 ‐900 ‐225 400 975 1500 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000 3975
120 ‐10400 ‐9225 ‐8100 ‐7025 ‐6000 ‐5025 ‐4100 ‐3225 ‐2400 ‐1625 ‐900 ‐225 400 975 1500 1975 2400 2775 3100 3375 3600 3775 3900 3975 4000
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